Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

158 Missing Pieces
Photo reconnaissance was clearly a vital part of the UN intelligence collection plan, and
the first USN assets were deployed onboard USS Philippine Sea in July 1950. These used
piston-engined aircraft and cameras optimised for photography from only 1500 metres, well
within range of Communist AA fire. It was not until June 1952 that the carriers assigned
to Korean operations carried a full outfit of jet aircraft equipped with cameras capable of
operating at the safe height of 4500 metres. 493 By that time Communist skills in disguising
targets or, if this was not feasible, their construction of sophisticated AA defences, made the
collection of intelligence from low level less useful and highly dangerous. 494 Naval customers
also had some recourse to the reconnaissance facilities of other Services through the Joint
Operations Center attached to the US 5th Air Force. This center was the closest to a joint
headquarters that existed in Korea. Operated by the USAF, it linked the US 8th Army and
CTF 95, and was responsible for allocating and directing the UN air effort. One RN officer
was attached to a predominantly American naval staff element, which screened intelligence
for naval use and raised requests for coverage of targets of naval interest. 495
Useful intelligence could be gained from submarine periscope photography. COMNAVFE
had four submarines under his command at the start of the war. Although two were briskly
dispatched to patrol the La Perouse Strait to watch for departures from the Soviet naval
ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok to the north, one at least was used in the intelligencecollection
role continuously. 496 Collection was only possible in the deeper waters off the
east coast of Korea, but patrols were also conducted off the north Chinese coast, where the
Soviet Union was developing the port of Dalian under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. 497
As the war progressed, electronic warfare (EW) information on NKPA and other Communist
emitters assumed a higher priority in intelligence collection. The USN began flying EW
patrols off the east coast of Korea in 1951, and by late 1952 this was a regular patrol line. In
November 1952, C7F recommended that an Army EW site be established on Yodo Island to
back up this collection effort, and by January 1952 all EW-equipped ships in the UN Naval
Command were directed to watch for radar signals from shore batteries and to conduct
EW surveillance as a secondary mission while on patrol. 498
However, in the end, it was human intelligence that made up the bulk of the information
used in the operations in which RAN destroyers and frigates were engaged. At the formal
level, a team of officers was detached from the COMNAVFE intelligence staff in October
1950 to collect information on ports, harbours and coastlines of amphibious interest. 499
To this data, ships of the operating forces added their own collected during the course of
their operations. Further intelligence was gleaned from ROK Navy units, which operated
in conjunction with the Australians and were adept at spotting unusual activity that
might suggest infiltration from the north into their territory. 500 This was supplemented by
information, often unassessed, provided by pro-ROK guerrillas. Because they could mingle
unnoticed in Communist-held or -dominated territory, they were often the best sources of
intelligence available, although the reliability of their information was uncertain. 501