Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
131 Burrell, Mermaids Do Exist, pp. 284—300 — Appendix I, ‘Joint UK-USA Staff Conversations:
Telegraphic Reports by Australian Naval Attaché February/March 1941’. Burrell recorded
the full text of the messages he sent to Australia while acting as an observer at these Anglo-
American talks.
132 NAA A2684/3, Item 597 — Disposition of RAN Squadron.
133 Robert Brooke-Popham, ‘Operations in the Far East, from 17th October 1940 to 27th December
1941’, Supplement to the London Gazette of 20 January 1948, p. 564.
134 In commenting on this belief, Nobutoshi Hagihara, ‘Postscript to Chapter 4: Anglo-Japanese
Attitudes, 1940—41’, in Ian Nish (ed), Anglo-Japanese Alienation 1919—1952: Papers of the
Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 99—100, observed that there were several reasons for a decline
in a sense of political realism in Japanese ruling circles, but their lack of experience of total
war, which haunted European survivors of WWI, was one.
135 This was not limited to official resentment. Agawa demonstrated the intensity
of public feeling on the issue of the perceived slight of Japan through the
enforcement of a 5:5:3 agreement in London. [Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant
Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, Kodansha International, Tokyo,1979,
pp. 27—30.] A former British military attaché in Tokyo referred to the ending of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty at the Washington Conference as causing ‘a dull glow of resentment, which
every now and again showed signs of bursting into flames’. [Major General FSG Piggott
quoted in Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East 1930—1945,
Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1997, p. 21.]
136 Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence, pp. 83—84.
137 Layton, ‘And I Was There’, pp. 54—55.
138 Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence, p. 84.
139 Tota Ishimura, Japan Must Fight Britain, The Paternoster Library, London, 1938. The book
was popular in Japan and widely read in Britain, and makes interesting reading today.
140 UKNA ADM 178/178 — Difficulties encountered by the naval attaché in Tokyo in visits to
naval and industrial establishments, letter of 6 April 1936.
141 Arthur J Marder, Old Friends New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Japanese Imperial
Navy—Strategic Illusions, 1939—1941, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 303.
142 David Evans, & Mark Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese
Navy 1887—1941, Naval Academy Press, Annapolis, Md, 1989, pp. 373—375.
143 UKNA ADM 116/5757—The Hilliken Report on Japanese Warship Construction, 1936.
144 Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, pp. 29—30. The US Office of Naval Intelligence responded
to this report with the warning that attaches ‘ought to be more careful in reporting
characteristics of aircraft’.
145 Denis Richards, & Hilary St George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939—1945: Vol. II, The Fight
Prevails, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1954, pp. 10—11. This official history clearly
showed that the British knew the characteristics of the Zero in 1940. Kirby forthrightly
attributed the blame to ‘faulty organisation at HQ Air Command, whose establishment did
not include an intelligence staff’. [Woodburn S Kirby with CT Addis, JF Meiklejohn, GT Wards,
& NL Desoer, The War Against Japan: Vol. 1, The Loss of Singapore, Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, London, 1957, p. 240.]
146 NAA A5954, Item 805/1—War Cabinet Meeting 20/01/41, Agendum 731—Japanese Planes
303