Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53
The operation went well, if not to plan. Blue Force landed successfully against light
opposition in an area already bombarded by Bataan, but the main body was delayed
in crossing to the peninsula, and the supporting strike aircraft had to be held in orbit
until their fuel was low. Their suppressive fire was therefore delivered before the main
body had closed their landing zone. A Communist counterattack in battalion strength
was broken up by Bataan’s guns, and the raiding parties were then free to proceed to
their objectives. Spotting of NGS by the Marine Corps post and by Yellow Force was
excellent and, through the operations plot kept by the US liaison officer, Bracegirdle was
kept well informed of the progress of the action ashore. The intelligence provided on the
strength and location of the NKPA proved accurate. 549 The guerrillas withdrew under
covering fire from Bataan when additional NKPA troops arrived on the peninsula.
The only downside of Operation ROUNDUP was in the results. Looting and destruction
were visited on the Communists, and ten families with affinity for the South were
brought off. But the guerrillas also wasted time in bringing off livestock and food, and
they executed all but one of the 30 prisoners they had taken. This violated a principal
objective of the raid. 550 Although the guerrillas had proven capable of undertaking a
major daylight raid, their reliability in carrying out orders was thus suspect. This piece
of intelligence had to form part of the planning process of all future similar operations.
However, intelligence had clearly played a key role in ensuring the success of this
one.
Operation ROUNDUP was a small action, but typical of many conducted by the westcoast
forces. Besides the clear advantages of UN possession of the islands, there was
the benefit that maintaining this hold did tie up the NKPA in coastal defence duties. The
struggle to protect and use the islands continued throughout the war, with the United
Nations only ceding ground where the effort required to keep control either exceeded
its material capability, or where the value of more ‘real estate’ was questionable.
Successive TG 95.1 commanders were wary about accepting responsibilities that would
tie their ships into static defence, particularly where UN artillery batteries could do
the job more cheaply.
The terms of the armistice reached at Panmunjom in 1953 called for UN evacuation
of islands lying to the north of the new armistice line. The final act of the west coast
blockade was the evacuation of their own forces, and those Korean citizens who wished
to live in the South from what would shortly become enemy territory. 551
• • • • •
175