Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

270 Missing Pieces
responsibility affected the ability of TG 95.1 to support the left flank of the UN armies.
It would appear that senior US decision making was not always in accordance with
intelligence, with the prolongation of Operation HAN as one example. USN surprise at
the sophistication of the mine threat posed by the NKPA reflects poorly on either the
quality of intelligence on the threat or the planning respect it was given. The degree of
importance accorded to ASW at the expense of other more productive tasks suggests
a similar shortfall in intelligence on Soviet or Chinese intentions and capabilities, or
its application to operations. 853
Research suggests that neither Australia nor the RAN made any attempt to assist
its ships or the United Nations generally with the collection or dissemination of
intelligence in Korea. The shortage of intelligence specialists on CTG 95.1’s staff offered
the RAN an opportunity to contribute and learn. This lost opportunity set a trend for
the RAN’s attitude towards collecting and providing intelligence to its operational
commanders. 854
The RAN contribution to the struggle against the MRLA during the Malayan Emergency
was as slight as the intelligence support provided. Naval forces were not deeply
engaged in security force operations, and Australian units only participated under the
umbrella of the FESR, which had been established to confront perceived Communist
expansion into Southeast Asia. This perception was fed by reporting from Australian
indigenous agencies and those of its allies and partners in a series of collective defence
arrangements born in the early 1950s. The impact of coalition intelligence on naval
circles had its effect on the RAN by requiring the development of structures, material
and tactics to conduct ASW operations in defence of Allied trade routes in the region.
This capability was never deployed operationally, and was at the expense of others
that would prove of more immediate value in further regional conflicts. 855
Principally through the JIB, the Australian Government and Defence were kept informed
on the slide of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia towards Confrontation. The
government was concerned that while supporting Malaysia it should not create an
enemy of Indonesia, and found the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, a ‘protocol
state’ under the Manila Treaty, an equally pressing issue and a harbinger of the ‘domino
theory’ in practice. The RAN units deployed to Confrontation were ‘second tier’ and,
in the case of the minesweepers, operating well outside the operational envelope for
which they were designed, equipped and trained. 856
Confrontation was the first campaign fought under the new British concept of joint
operations and integrated staffs. Personnel from all three services manned both Plans
and Intelligence staffs, and although RAN officers served in the Plans Division of this
HQ, none were seconded to the Joint Intelligence Staff. Units under CinCFE’s command
enjoyed intelligence support that melded contributions from all sources, including
Sigint. Australia contributed directly through its Sigint resources in Australia and
Singapore. These sources, plus the quality of human intelligence gathered at grassroots