Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

310 Missing Pieces
223 US National Archives, College Park Annex (NACP) RG38, box 95 — Records of the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action and operational reports — TF 17. CTF 17 Opord
2-42.
224 NACP RG38, box 95 — Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action and
operational reports — TF 17. CTG 17.5. [air commander] COMCARDIV 1 report A16-3/FB2-1 (0251) of
18 May 1942, ‘Action report — Coral Sea, May 7—8 1942’.
225 NACP RG38, box 95 — Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action
and operational reports — TF 17. CTF 17 Oporder 2-42.
226 The whole incident is covered in some depth by John Lundstrom, ‘A Failure of Radio
Intelligence: An Episode in the Battle of the Coral Sea’, Cryptologia 7, 1983, pp 99—118. The
problem occurred because of a garble in the recovered text. When associated with other
decrypts showing that the striking force was also to launch an attack on Port Moresby on 7
or 8 May, and raid bases on the Australian mainland (subsequently revealed to be options
offered to Takagi but not binding on him) the westerly estimated position of the Japanese
carriers became self-evident to Allied analysts.
227 Strategists and analysts have debated this decision ever since the battle. The consensus
is that this was a foolish decision, one which diluted the defences of TF 17 and may have
subtracted from the ability of the carriers to be protected. There is another aspect. Fletcher
was known to dislike what he called ‘mixed command’—having American units under the
tactical command of foreign officers. He told Captain Smith, commander of a cruiser division
at the Rabaul operation under Crace’s orders, that, ‘You’ll not have to do it again. Next time
I shall give him an independent command’. [William Ward Smith, Midway: Turning Point of
the Pacific, Crowell, New York, 1966, p. 22.]
228 Thomas, Japan’s War, pp. 156—157.
229 NACP RG38, box 95 — Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action
and operational reports — TF 17. CTF 17 A16-3/(0010N) of 27 May 1942, ‘The Battle of the
Coral Sea May 4—8, 1942’. Fletcher did not transmit during Coral Sea until after his 8 May
strike on Takagi.
230 Parker, A Priceless Advantage, pp. 29—30
231 Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign, p.72. The origin of the belief that Allied
battleships might be encountered appears to have had its origin in an appreciation of 28
April originated by Takagi. We are again reminded that the IJN was frequently ready to see
battleships where none could possibly be.
232 AWM 124, Item 4/216—SO (O) War Diary First Half 1942.
233 When a USN Dauntless dive bomber approached TG 17.3 requesting directions to Yorktown,
Crace was obliged to send the aircraft to Port Moresby instead. [Coulthard-Clark, Action
Stations!, p. 102.]
234 NAA A11093/1, Item 373/25A — RAAF Command HQ — Observations on the Employment of
Shore Based Aircraft in Coral Sea Engagements. Allied Air Forces Headquarters steadfastly
refused to accept responsibility for bombing TG 17.3 by B-17s, even though photos taken by
the aircraft proved the charge.
235 The Australian Prime Minister, for one, was not impressed by the outcome. ‘It was felt that
the results of the operation were rather disappointing, the more so as we had ample warning
of the enemy’s intentions, the prospective date of attack and the strength of his forces. With
the advantage of this information we should have been able to concentrate the superior
strength necessary to have ensured a complete victory’. [NAA A5954, box 50 — Letter of 16
May 1942 Curtin to MacArthur.]