Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
London, 2000, p. 226. Statement attributed to Chin at a workshop held at the Australian
National University, Canberra on 22 and 23 February 1999.
610 Donald Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948—60: The Domino That Stood, Brassey’s, London, 1997,
p. 106.
611 Smith, Counter Insurgency, p. 35.
612 Chin, My Side of History, pp. 351 and 327.
613 NAA A816, Item 6/301/650 — Report on Malaya by Australian Military Mission to Malaya
July—August 1950 of 11 September 1950, p. 46.
614 NAA MP1185/10, Item 5219/53/4 — Urgent Military Preparations Required in Malaya.
615 NAA A2031, Item Vol. 33 — Defence Committee Original Minutes 176—273, Minute 20/50 of
16 October 1950.
616 NAA MP1185/10, Item 5245/22/10 — Strategic Reserve — Programme of Action, Secretary
of Defence letter unnumbered of 8 June 1955 to the Secretary of the Navy.
617 NAA A2031/8, Item 4/1956 — ANZAM Defence Committee Memorandum 4/1956.
618 NAA A816/56, Item 19/321/3Y — FESR Directives to HMA Ships, 1956.
619 UKNA ADM 1/23646 — HMS Alacrity Report of Proceedings Period 26 April—8 May 1952.
620 A Ministry of Defence Minute of 13 November 1951 noted that one frigate, six minesweepers
and two motor launches were engaged, with additional forces being raised by the Malayan
Government. The estimated annual cost of the operations was £600,000. [UKNA DEFE
7/240—Malaya: Defence Expenditure.]
621 AWM78, Item 34/4 — HMAS Anzac Reports of Proceedings 1956, September 1956.
622 AWM78, Item 298/5 — HMAS Queenborough Reports of Proceedings 1956—57, January
1957.
623 Short, The Communist Insurrection, pp. 371—372. Grove noted that this activity was ‘fairly
constant’ but agreed with Short that many of the missions were in the nature of harassment.
[Eric J Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II, The Bodley Head,
London, 1987, pp. 150—151.]
624 Other forces involved included three infantry battalions, seven special units (jungle-trained
police patrols) and a force of ex-CTs. The operation was successful, not so much in killing
CTs but in breaking their morale and persuading them to surrender. [Short, The Communist
Insurrection, pp. 489—492.]
625 Photo reconnaissance was also useful in spotting areas of food cultivation in the jungle. [Karl
Hack, ‘British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example
of Malaya’, Intelligence and National Security 14, 1999, pp. 124—155, p. 148 & footnote 23.]
626 UKNA CO 1022/317 — Supply of Arms to Bandits in Malaya, Abstract of Intelligence 16—31
October 1951.
627 The Attack class patrol boat project was not commenced until September 1965, its genesis,
apparently, was experience gained in Confrontation, rather than the Malayan Emergency.
[Stevens, Royal Australian Navy, pp. 199—201.]
628 NAA A1209/23, Item 1957/4152 — Strategic basis of Australian defence policy 1953, Defence
Committee Minute 368/1952 of 8 January 53. ‘Indo-China is the key to the defence of South
East Asia as it provides defence in depth of Australia and New Zealand’. [paragraph 35.]
‘Allied military measures in South East Asia should be based on coordinated agreed regional
policy’. [paragraph 44.] ‘Australia is Safe Unless Malaya Falls’. [paragraph 45.] Almost
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