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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53<br />

But the most important development was the decision to regularise the Allied Sigint<br />

exchange arrangements that had developed during WWII. At the London Signals<br />

Conference of April 1946, the Commonwealth partners agreed to maintain their<br />

relationships, and the Chifley Government approved Australia’s participation in the<br />

Commonwealth Sigint Organisation on 12 November 1947. 455 Britain then acted on<br />

behalf of her smaller partners in negotiating the ‘UKUSA’ Agreement with the United<br />

States, which entered into force in 1948.<br />

The remnants of FRUMEL, the <strong>Australian</strong> personnel who had worked in Central<br />

Bureau, and the RAN’s shore wireless stations, the wireless units of the Army and<br />

RAAF, provided the framework for an excellent and respected post-war Sigint service.<br />

A Melbourne Signals Intelligence Centre was agreed at the 1946 London conference,<br />

and the organisation was brought into official existence by the <strong>Australian</strong> Government<br />

on 23 July 1946 as the Defence Signals Bureau (DSB). Its role was ‘to exploit foreign<br />

communications and be responsible for communications security in the <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Services and Government Departments.’ 456<br />

Developments were equally significant from an intelligence analysis viewpoint. With<br />

the relocation to Japan of GHQ SWPA as the Headquarters Supreme Commander<br />

Allied Powers, there was a need to replace the intelligence service it had provided. The<br />

outcome of many discussions was the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB),<br />

overseen by the Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to provide military<br />

and political leaders with strategic intelligence. This bureau was to have an important<br />

influence on the development of <strong>Australian</strong> strategy towards the region. 457<br />

The nascent <strong>Australian</strong> intelligence apparatus required skilled personnel, much of<br />

which was departing the services for more highly paid civilian jobs with apparently<br />

better prospects. 458 The RAN eviscerated its intelligence capabilities with the<br />

disbandment of the RAN Reserve and the Women’s <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> Naval Service<br />

(WRANS), which had provided the majority of the intelligence personnel during the<br />

war. 459 With them went the hard-earned experience that had supported the naval<br />

operational commanders during the conflict. However, the RAN did become involved<br />

in the collection of strategic intelligence, with the attachment of officers to CCAS staff<br />

for collection on ‘Saigon-Manila to the North’ and on Japan, and with another officer<br />

sent as a ‘political observer’ in Saigon. 460<br />

Two other intelligence organisations deserve a short mention. An <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Intelligence and Security Service (ASIS) was established along the lines of the wartime<br />

Special Operations Australia to covertly collect non-military intelligence in regional<br />

countries. 461 Finally, in response to concerns over <strong>Australian</strong> security voiced principally<br />

by the United States, the <strong>Australian</strong> Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was<br />

established in March 1949 with the role of counter-intelligence.<br />

• • • • •<br />

151

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