Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
528 The Communists claimed they held all of the land north of the Han. In fact, the area remained
disputed territory, patrolled by pro-UN guerrillas for the most part. [Cagle & Manson, The
Sea War, p. 326.]
529 For a vivid description of the predicament faced by a frigate aground in the Han, see JPD
Hall, ‘Code books’, in GF Hopkins (ed), Tales from Korea: The Royal New Zealand Navy in the
Korean War, Royal New Zealand Navy Museum, Auckland, NZ, 2002, pp. 113—115. A ship
stranded at low water would lose all power, as neither steam nor diesel engines could draw
cooling water when high and dry. Quite apart from any list which might develop, this would
critically affect the ship’s self defence capability.
530 Scott-Moncrieff’s doubts were expressed thus: ‘Ships can generally outrange shore batteries
but, at long range even with air spotting, the chance of a hit is very small and an immense
amount of ammunition has to be fired to achieve destruction…There is very little information
on the damage caused to shore batteries by ships’ gunfire and it is believed that much of the
damage claimed is exaggerated. The fact is that they are extremely difficult to locate, are
well protected and, despite a very great deal of counter bombardment from ships and attacks
from the air, they continue to open fire’. [O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 453—454.]
531 Robert E Capes, HMAS Murchison, ‘Baron of the Han’, Naval Historical Society of Australia,
Sydney, 2002.
532 The scope and nature of the operation as described by Vice Admiral Dyer is recorded in
Cagle & Manson, The Sea War, pp. 326—328.
533 O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 455. It must have been an exciting time for all, especially Vice
Admiral Dyer. Had he been so unfortunate as to be killed in the melee, this would have been
a major coup for the Communists. As it was, he not only survived but also congratulated
Lieutenant Commander Dollard and his men for their seamanship and conduct under fire.
He also ordered the operation intensified, and the Yellow Sea carrier was required to bomb
the Yonan Peninsula daily. [Field, History, p. 420.]
534 Dollard interview. Tank commanders rarely become engaged in gun duels with warships,
and this commander probably did not realise that had he employed different ammunition
the damage and consequences to Murchison would have been far more serious.
535 Dollard interview. ROK guerrillas later reported one 75mm gun destroyed and 40 dead
Communists.
536 Ronald McKie, ‘Baron Murchison of Han’, in Norman Bartlett (ed), With the Australians in
Korea, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1954, p. 243. In all, the UN survey parties took
85,000 soundings charted 26nm of channels and laid 33 navigation buoys to assist the
bombarding ships. It was customary for leadsmen to be employed in the bows of the ship,
sounding with a leadline to obviate this possibility. Naturally, this exposed them to some
danger from enemy fire. Similarly, the channels were so narrow that frigates would turn at
anchor using their engines, during which time the whole of the cable party was also exposed
to enemy fire. [Capes, HMAS Murchison, p. 15.]
537 Capes, HMAS Murchison, p. 20. Dollard stated that ‘We destroyed during these operations
all of the weapons which we believed were hidden in farmhouses. Once we had the range
on a farmhouse, we’d blow up the farmhouse and the guns went with it’. [Department of
Veterans’ Affairs media release 24 June 2000.]
538 McKie, ‘Baron Murchison’, p. 242.
539 Cagle & Manson, The Sea War, p. 328.
337