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1 The Birth of Science - MSRI

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6.3 Saving the Phainomena 151<br />

alone. 14 <strong>The</strong> road chosen by Euclid consists in not starting from absolutely<br />

“elementary” theoretical entities, such as points appear to be, but directly<br />

from statements on lines and circles.<br />

In the second place, were the postulates or “hypotheses” <strong>of</strong> Hellenistic<br />

theories verifiable statements?<br />

In almost every case, verifiability is excluded by the universal character<br />

<strong>of</strong> the statement in question: how can one check that something holds “for<br />

every pair <strong>of</strong> points” or “for every straight-line segment”? We can only<br />

check (approximately) particular statements implied by the postulates.<br />

And generality is not the only problem. Consider, for example, the postulate<br />

on which the Archimedean treatment <strong>of</strong> hydrostatics is based (see<br />

page 65). This statement cannot be verified even in particular cases. How page 195<br />

can one check, in non-equilibrium conditions (for instance, immediately<br />

after opening a dam), the action that a particular small portion <strong>of</strong> liquid,<br />

immersed in the whole, exerts on a neighboring portion? It is clear that<br />

Archimedes is making an assumption that is not directly verifiable, and<br />

that its interest for him lies in the possibility <strong>of</strong> deducing from it many<br />

verifiable statements about what happens in equilibrium conditions.<br />

In sum, it is clear that the initial assumptions <strong>of</strong> Hellenistic scientific<br />

theories were neither obvious nor verifiable. What, then, could have been<br />

the criterion with which they were chosen? <strong>The</strong> next sections are devoted<br />

to this problem.<br />

6.3 Saving the Phainomena<br />

In his Outlines <strong>of</strong> Pyrrhonism, the Skeptic Sextus Empiricus writes:<br />

We [Skeptics] do not contest that which compels us to involuntary<br />

assent [©] to a sensorial impression, which is to say the<br />

phainomena. 15<br />

He is reporting here the Stoic conception <strong>of</strong> phainomena or “appearances”<br />

(). According to the Stoics, a phainomenon does not involve just<br />

a (passive) sensorial impression; also essential is the assent (©)<br />

<strong>of</strong> the subject, at once active and involuntary. 16 Strato <strong>of</strong> Lampsacus, too,<br />

14 An interesting work dealing with this problem has survived: the pseudo-Aristotelian De lineis<br />

insecabilibus, dating probably form the late fourth century B.C. It argues for the impossibility <strong>of</strong><br />

constructing geometric magnitudes (and lines, in particular) by putting points together.<br />

15 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneae hypotyposes, I, x, 19.<br />

16 <strong>The</strong> Stoics considered also voluntary assent, but we will be interested primarily in the involuntary<br />

kind, a typical example <strong>of</strong> which is provided by the recognition <strong>of</strong> a known person, which<br />

happens through a comparison between visual impression and memory. <strong>The</strong> Stoics discussed at<br />

length the possibility <strong>of</strong> identifying an erroneously given assent; see [Gould] (pp. 56–62), [Frede]<br />

Revision: 1.7 Date: 2002/09/14 23:17:37

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