Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
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234 CHAPTER 6<br />
Books 2 <strong>and</strong> 3 concern his later experimental investigations of the colors in<br />
thin films <strong>and</strong> of diffraction. Although Newton’s mathematical perspective is<br />
unmistakable in the concepts employed <strong>and</strong> the quantification effected, the<br />
mathematical reasoning at the heart of his underst<strong>and</strong>ing of colors is implicit.<br />
Opticks presented the new science of colors as an experimental theory.<br />
The core of Newton’s optical investigations consisted of the search of<br />
phenomenological laws <strong>and</strong> properties of light. He did speculate on the<br />
corpuscular nature of light <strong>and</strong> color <strong>and</strong> their properties, but from the onset<br />
he barred these from his established theories. In his view, experimental<br />
philosophy should not be contaminated by hypotheses or other ill-founded<br />
assumptions, as Descartes had done. This level of causation, distinguished<br />
from the level of experimentally demonstrated properties, implied so-called<br />
hypothetical philosophizing which Newton pursued publicly only once, in<br />
his 1675 paper for the Royal Society ‘Hypothesis explaining the properties of<br />
light’. Speculations on unobservable matter in motion, did play a part in<br />
Newton’s optics however. One of the reasons he dropped the ‘Cartesian’<br />
dispersion law seems to have been that it conflicted with his most private<br />
thought on the corpuscular nature of colors. Yet, this remained concealed<br />
from its readers.<br />
To stress the lucidity of mathematics against the obscurity of natural<br />
philosophy was rather a ‘topos’ in the seventeenth-century. Like Newton,<br />
Huygens thought that Descartes had gone astray in presuming that the laws<br />
of optics could be derived from a priori truths. A mechanistic hypothesis<br />
could not by itself prove anything. Unlike Newton however, Huygens did<br />
not banish hypotheses from his optics. On the contrary, the question how to<br />
establish proper ‘raisons de mechanique’ <strong>and</strong> built a mathematical science of<br />
optics from them, was his main concern. According to Huygens, the causes<br />
of the behavior of light were ultimately hypothetical. His problem was how<br />
to find the right hypotheses. In the first place, this meant to establish<br />
veritably mechanistic causes of the properties of light. As contrasted to the<br />
speculations of Hooke <strong>and</strong> Descartes, Huygens wanted his mechanistic<br />
explanations to be comprehensible. That is, a hypothetical mechanism had to<br />
be exact <strong>and</strong> to conform to the established laws of motion. Huygens’<br />
principle defined ethereal waves mathematically <strong>and</strong> prescribed how a<br />
propagated wave could be constructed geometrically. In this way it explained<br />
the laws of optics accurately, by means of mathematical derivation.<br />
From the perspective of seventeenth-century geometrical optics,<br />
Huygens’ principle can be seen as a law. But it was a new kind of law: a law<br />
of unobservable waves instead of rays. Light consisted of waves <strong>and</strong> these<br />
could be treated in the same manner as the rays of traditional optics. He<br />
defined the properties of these waves in the same law-like manner. By<br />
mathematizing the mechanistic causes of the laws of optics, Huygens<br />
extended geometrical optics into the realm of the unobservable. For<br />
methodological reasons Newton would not allow such a thing, although he<br />
was quite capable of mathematizing mechanistic causes. As compared to the