Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
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LENSES & WAVES 261<br />
other part of physical optics in which experiment was used as a heuristic tool<br />
for exploring new phenomena of light <strong>and</strong> establishing their mathematical<br />
properties. In this way he had extended the mathematical science of optics to<br />
the quality of color. Huygens had extended it to the mechanistic causes of<br />
the laws of optics. By applying Galileo’s science of motion to the motions of<br />
ethereal particles, he had invented the most complete form of mathematical<br />
physics in the seventeenth century.<br />
Huygens <strong>and</strong> Descartes<br />
Traité de la Lumière gave a new form to mechanistic science, the first<br />
‘thoroughly Cartesian’ theory of light. Yet – <strong>and</strong> this is the gist of my<br />
argument – it was not the outcome of some program in mechanistic, or even<br />
Cartesian, science. A careful reconstruction of what exactly were the leading<br />
questions for Huygens, juxtaposed with comparable pursuits of other<br />
protagonists of seventeenth-century optics, reveals that Huygens’ wave<br />
theory was the outcome of his typically rigorous <strong>and</strong> tenacious approach to a<br />
problem raised in the context of geometrical optics. As was his wont, he first<br />
of all wanted to get the mathematics of his solution right. He wanted the<br />
explanations of the various laws to be mathematical derivations that were<br />
mutually consistent. As a result of the particular character of the ‘matter’ of<br />
geometrical optics – light rays, which had come to be seen as being of a<br />
mechanistic nature – he got involved in mechanistic questions. He did so in a<br />
deliberately mathematical way, intending to stick to the rigor of mathematics<br />
he missed in the reasonings of his fellows at the Académie. He believed in<br />
the power of mathematical reasoning <strong>and</strong> did not content himself with illdefined<br />
mechanisms.<br />
This reaction to the Parisian Cartesians can be seen as a continuation of<br />
what I regard as Huygens’ lifelong reaction to Descartes. Much of his oeuvre<br />
was a direct response to what Descartes had said on impact, circular motion,<br />
curves, lenses, light, halos, etc. He did so in a clearly mechanistic context,<br />
accepting fundamental concepts <strong>and</strong> drawing inspiration from some of<br />
Descartes’ ideas. In his theories of gravity <strong>and</strong> light he also considered the<br />
conceptualization of the mechanistic nature of things. Discours was induced<br />
by the – in his view – obscurities vented on the Parisian scene. Pardies may<br />
have inspired his thinking on the nature of light <strong>and</strong> the intellectual climate<br />
at the Académie, but strange refraction – together with the problem of<br />
caustics – may well have been the sole occasion for Huygens’ consideration<br />
of the mechanics of light propagation.<br />
As an adolescent, Huygens had soaked up Principia Philosophiae <strong>and</strong> its<br />
clarity of reasoning had made an indelible impression on him. The idea that<br />
nature ultimately consists of passive matter in motion was always at the back<br />
of his mind. But this does not turn Huygens into a Cartesian. Mechanistic<br />
philosophy was merely a tacitly assumed background of his thinking.<br />
Huygens quite consistently confined himself to the mathematics of these