Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
Lenses and Waves
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1690 - TRAITÉ DE LA LUMIÈRE 241<br />
paper contained a mechanistic theory that remained essentially qualitative. In<br />
the light of the precepts of Traité de la Lumière it could not be called an<br />
instance of ‘true philosophy’.<br />
The message of the paper could not, however, be mistaken. It made clear<br />
what, in Huygens’ view, mechanistic explanation ought to be about. His was<br />
the fourth <strong>and</strong> last of a series of papers on gravity read at the Académie in<br />
August 1669. On the 7th, Roberval had opened the debate with a paper that<br />
seems to be an express denial of everything Huygens stood for. 93 He chose to<br />
account for gravity by proposing a mutual attraction between bodies of the<br />
same kind. He did specify how such an attraction explained the properties of<br />
gravity. He explicitly rejected efforts to explain it by the movement of a<br />
subtle matter because he had never seen anything that was not problematic.<br />
In his reaction to Huygens’ paper, four weeks later, Roberval said:<br />
“… he excludes from nature without proof attractive <strong>and</strong> expulsive qualities <strong>and</strong> he<br />
wants to introduce without foundation solely sizes, shapes <strong>and</strong> movement.” 94<br />
In reply, Huygens said that he excluded those qualities because<br />
“… I search for an intelligible cause of gravity, as it seems to me that it would be saying<br />
as much as nothing when attributing the cause why heavy bodies descend to the earth<br />
to some attractive quality of the earth or of these bodies themselves, but for the<br />
movement, the shape <strong>and</strong> the sizes of bodies I do not see how one can say that I<br />
introduce them without foundation since the senses make use know that these things<br />
are in nature.” 95<br />
This, then, was the raison d’être of the paper on gravity. In Roberval’s use of<br />
attractive qualities he saw a relapse into the incomprehensible thinking<br />
Descartes had dispensed with. He would not accept active principles in<br />
nature that were not intelligible in terms of matter in motion.<br />
But did Huygens regard attractive qualities as incomprehensible only<br />
because of his Cartesian leanings? I think not. The 1669 paper on gravity had<br />
been preceded by years of mathematical study of motions. In these he had<br />
persistently reduced all phenomena of impact <strong>and</strong> acceleration to the<br />
Galilean science of motion. Westfall describes in full detail his “… constant<br />
effort to eliminate dynamic concepts <strong>and</strong> to treat mechanics as kinematics,<br />
…” 96 Huygens found that whatever could not be expressed in terms of<br />
velocities escapes mathematical treatment. In my view, Huygens rejected<br />
attractive forces not only because his mechanistic convictions forbade them,<br />
but also because such concepts were problematic from a mathematical point<br />
93 OC19, 628-630. Frenicle <strong>and</strong> Buot followed on 14 <strong>and</strong> 21 August respectively, summarised in OC19,<br />
630-631. Huygens read his paper – the longest – on 28 August. On 4 September, Roberval <strong>and</strong> Mariotte<br />
gave their comments to which Huygens replied on 23 October; OC19, 640-644.<br />
94 OC19, 640. “… il exclud de la nature sans preuve les qualitez attractives et expulsives et il veut<br />
introduire sans fondement les seules gr<strong>and</strong>eurs, les figures et le mouvement.”<br />
95 OC19, 642. “… parce que je cherche une cause intelligible de la pesanteur, car il me semble que ce seroit<br />
dire autant que rien que d’attribuer la cause pourquoy les corps pesants descendent vers la terre, a quelque<br />
qualité attractive de la terre ou des corps mesmes, mais pour le mouvement la figure et les gr<strong>and</strong>eurs des<br />
corps je ne vois pas comment on peut dire que je les introduicts sans fondement puisque les sens nous<br />
font connoistre que ces choses sont dans la nature.”<br />
96 Westfall, Force, 177.