Organised Crime & Crime Prevention - what works? - Scandinavian ...

NSfK’s 40. forskerseminar, Espoo, Finland 1998
To avoid confusion of organized crime per se and crime in a broader sense, various
researchers have developed methods for distinguishing them. Donald Cressey places
organized crime in quotation marks when he speaks of it in the popular sense, but omits the
quotation marks when he uses the term in its scientific sense (Cressey, 1969). Michael Maltz
distinguishes between organized crime (general meaning) and organized crime (specific
meaning) (Maltz, 1985). Joseph Albini has proposed using the term syndicated crime for the
specific form of organized crime (Albini, 1971). None of these proposals have caught on,
however.
If one wishes to use the term organized crime, he must isolate the distinctive features of such
crime that will distinguish it from other forms of collective crime. Such a definition would
focus on the power aspect of organized crime. The conclusive feature which distinguishes
organized crime from all other forms of collective crime and makes organized crime a serious
social problem is that organized crime comprises an economic and physical power factor that
can place itself above customary laws and legal principles, either by the use of corruption or
by threatening the authorities’ monopoly on the exercise of power. Thus, it can form a
parallel power and authority that appropriates the official authorities’ tools of power and
monopoly position in the areas of legal proceedings, the physical exercise of force, and
taxation.
It is these community-threatening traits that comprise the distinctive feature of organized
crime and that actually make the case for the concept of organized crime: the establishment of
a parallel social power structure with special rights and means of force, as well as the
corruption of the judicial system and other authorities by means of economic or violent force.
It is in these traits of organized crime—i.e. the methods used to commit and conceal criminal
activity—that a descriptive and analytical definition should concentrate on.
Why has the EU chosen to use such a broad and imprecise definition of organized crime? It is
primarily for political reasons. By raising a number of broad criteria for organized crime, this
type of crime is made to appear more extensive and serious than it would if more precise and
limited criteria were used. And since organized crime has been defined previously in only a
few member states and since, in general, it is difficult to define organized crime, it has been
possible to define the scope of the joint concepts more freely than it would have been for
criminal forms that had already been defined specifically.
Presumably, the previously existing definitions have also helped dilute the criteria.
Countries such as Italy, France, Portugal, and Germany already had national, penal definitions
and, moreover, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom had operational definitions used by
the national police authorities.6 Since the joint criteria were supposed to be based on—and, to
a certain extent, to integrate previously existing national definitions and classifications, it was
probably necessary to reach compromises that stand in the way of a more optimal form of
classification and definition.
A third reason is that this way of understanding organized crime has achieved
international acceptance—presumably by virtue of United States’ influence on international
police work, on legal cooperation, and particularly on the myth making of crimes. By using
the concept of organized crime and linking the efforts against organized crime to the police
and penal authorities within the EU, it is possible to tie into the popular, mass media-based
myths of the Mafia, criminal syndicates, and an underworld that is an illegal copy of the
law-abiding world (Bay, 1992).
6 The national definitions and classifications of organized crime are indicated in (Statewatch, 1994);
(Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende Narkotika og Organiseret Kriminalitet, 1995) and (Adamoli et al., 1998).
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