Dialogue in Pursuit of Development - Are you looking for one of ...

ent side are in charge or at least partly responsible for project design. Complaints
from the recipient side about a lack of influence are frequent in a
mode of project implementation which leaves the most important decisions
to consultants and specialists from the donor country.
Another interesting aspect arises from the fact that sector specialists on
donor and recipient sides often find it easy to agree on project design and
implementation, while those responsible for project finance on either side
(finance ministry and donor agency respectively) may disagree with the
specialists because they consider the proposal too expensive. Here, the
point of debate often concerns quality versus cost, and the specialists will
argue against their paymasters. In many cases, vested interests on both sides
collude to prolong a project beyond the point where external resource
inputs are necessary or even productive (Catterson and Lindahl, 1999).
The financial programme managers on either side often find it difficult to
withstand opposition when exposed to pressure from their own technical
expertise.
Asymmetric information
In addition to the inequality of financial and political power which characterises
the aid relationship, the dialogue partners also have widely different
access to information. The recipient sometimes has the upper hand in knowing
the internal workings of government and the political conditions for
getting a project or policy implemented, but the IFIs are almost always
better equipped with statistical data and analytical tools for evaluating the
impact of alternative policies. They have access to international data repositories
which can give crushing statistical evidence in support of practically
every kind of conclusion that the IFI delegation wishes to pursue. In many
cases, they even have better domestic data than the recipient officials, e.g.
when the World Bank has funded the survey in the country and commissioned
the analytical work. The negotiators on the recipient team are overworked
and too few of them are experienced enough to assess the quality
of all this information, let alone draw alternative conclusions from it. This
imbalance may drive the recipient into a defensive position, and rather than
stimulating dialogue the abundance of material may clog up the channels of
communication.
Asymmetric information affects the game plans for the negotiating parties.
When negotiating for a new project proposal, the donor side usually
knows less than the recipient about the prospects of various preconditions
being fulfilled by domestic agencies. There may be budget estimates and
manning plans for implementing agencies, but only the government
insiders can tell whether they are realistic. In a situation like this, the donor
may wish to undertake a short-term pilot project to test the ground before
making any major commitment. This gives the recipient a strong incentive
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