Dialogue in Pursuit of Development - Are you looking for one of ...

change within these societies, it demonstrates their impotence. Thus, the aid
process creates a ‘Catch 22’ scenario: the weaker national accountability is,
the more donors are tempted to tighten the requirements and control mechanisms,
which are difficult to meet precisely because of the weak institutions
and governance. Donors’ further disengagement from countries with insufficient
conditions, in reality only aggravates the situation for the poorest of
the population. Such countries need more not less. If the development process
is not successful that does not mean that we should abandon it altogether,
but rather that we should change the method of intervention to one
that works in those particular conditions. For example, in a case of weak
and/or uncooperative governments we should look into working with other
partners, such as civil society and NGOs, toward creating the necessary conditions
for reforms to take hold.
The lending and resource mobilization under the PRSPs provides a test
case for the compatibility between conditionality and ownership, since
conditionality remains an important component of the PRSP process. In the
context of the PRSPs, the World Bank and the IMF view conditionality as a
policy compact based on mutual commitment to poverty reduction and
policy reforms. They see conditionality as a lender’s commitment to engage
and lend, whereas a borrower ownership represents the country’s commitment
to improve policies and institutions, with the aim of reducing poverty
and promoting sustainable growth. Under that view of conditionality, instead
of imposing a position on a borrower, a lender commits to lend under
certain jointly determined conditions. But if a consensus has been reached
about the broad objectives of the program and its directions, there should
be little (if any) need or justification for imposing conditions – especially
when conditionalities are intermediate conditions, such as economic stability,
that have not been proved to guarantee poverty reduction.
Further, the WB and the IMF have suggested that conditionality should
be seen as a process that evolves over time, with the due consultation of all
concerned parties, and as such, is a part of the dialogue between the lender
and the country, and not an alternative. By looking at conditionality as a
process built around dialogue, the World Bank and the IMF have tried to
give a new meaning and modality to conditionality. It is to form an ongoing
process through which the Bank and the borrower would develop and nurture
trust and commitment as the reform program progresses. This, however,
makes sense only if there are options to choose from. If the blueprint
is designed and advanced by only one party, dialogue as such is a mere pretence.
If PRSP conditionalities are not disclosed and brought to the public
domain it further enhances mistrust. Although the forms of conditionality
and ownership evolve over time, it is akin to a ‘repeated game’ that builds,
but also can destroy reputation and trust, and thus hamper the dialogue.
Without trust and open dialogue, there is the danger that PRSPs can be
seen as yet another donor requirement rather than a donor support to gov-
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