Dialogue in Pursuit of Development - Are you looking for one of ...
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L<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the results <strong>of</strong> the policy dialogue to the<br />
provision <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial assistance<br />
The conduct <strong>of</strong> policy discussions is widespread <strong>in</strong>ternationally and is not<br />
limited to the dialogue between donor countries and <strong>in</strong>stitutions and governments<br />
<strong>of</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries. This is not surpris<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce the policy<br />
framework <strong>of</strong> any country is <strong>of</strong> importance to other countries as well. Thus,<br />
<strong>in</strong> the OECD detailed discussions are held on the economic policies <strong>of</strong> all<br />
its member countries. The European Central Bank and the European Union<br />
conduct surveillance activities <strong>of</strong> their member countries to ensure that<br />
members con<strong>for</strong>m to the understand<strong>in</strong>gs reached under the Growth and<br />
Stability Pact. The ASEAN Secretariat also carries out surveillance activities<br />
<strong>for</strong> its members <strong>in</strong> East Asia. In the case <strong>of</strong> the European Union there is<br />
provision <strong>for</strong> sanctions if member countries persistently do not adhere to<br />
the understand<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the Growth and Stability Pact.<br />
The development co-operation system provides <strong>for</strong> explicit and direct<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ks between the implementation <strong>of</strong> policy re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries<br />
and the provision <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial assistance by donors. The l<strong>in</strong>kage <strong>of</strong> policy<br />
re<strong>for</strong>m implementation and the provision <strong>of</strong> aid will typically become<br />
stronger as a recipient government’s dependency on donor support <strong>in</strong>creases<br />
(and as development per<strong>for</strong>mance recedes), and if high, would provide a<br />
justification <strong>for</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g such a strong l<strong>in</strong>k. If practised effectively, the ‘application<br />
<strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial leverage’ could become an important <strong>in</strong>strument <strong>for</strong><br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> that agreed-upon policy re<strong>for</strong>ms are <strong>in</strong>deed implemented.<br />
To <strong>in</strong>duce the Zambian government <strong>in</strong> the 1990s to implement its programme<br />
<strong>in</strong> accordance with its design, donors made certa<strong>in</strong> that there would<br />
be a direct l<strong>in</strong>k between programme implementation and the provision <strong>of</strong><br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial support. Donors did this by apply<strong>in</strong>g several <strong>in</strong>ducement techniques.<br />
Sometimes, they would <strong>for</strong>mulate quantitative or ‘qualitative’, or<br />
‘structural’ but ‘time-tabled’ benchmarks, <strong>for</strong> government action, the meet<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>of</strong> which would demonstrate to donors that programme implementation<br />
was on track. 9 An example was the <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>in</strong> Policy Framework Papers<br />
(PFPs) <strong>of</strong> ‘time-tabled’ policy re<strong>for</strong>m commitments. This technique<br />
was employed by the IMF under its programmes and also by the World<br />
Bank <strong>in</strong> its ‘policy-based operations’. It made <strong>for</strong> very explicit<br />
‘conditionalities’. Sometimes conditionalities would also be <strong>for</strong>mulated <strong>in</strong><br />
more general and qualitative terms, such as ‘mak<strong>in</strong>g progress with strengthen<strong>in</strong>g<br />
governance’, which left much room <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation. And sometimes<br />
there would be no conditionality at all, because all policy measures<br />
had already been taken by the government. But the general pr<strong>in</strong>ciple was<br />
that donors would make certa<strong>in</strong> that they could adjust the implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> their aid programmes to changes <strong>in</strong> re<strong>for</strong>m programme implementation<br />
9 And thus, that the release <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial support was justified.<br />
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