CP12/32: Implementation of the Alternative ... - BVCA admin
CP12/32: Implementation of the Alternative ... - BVCA admin
CP12/32: Implementation of the Alternative ... - BVCA admin
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<strong>CP12</strong>/<strong>32</strong><br />
<strong>Implementation</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Alternative</strong> Investment Fund Managers Directive<br />
Annex 1X<br />
<strong>the</strong> investment strategies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir funds. We expect that some firm business models will be<br />
directly affected by <strong>the</strong> delegation, marketing, remuneration, depositary rules and o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
69. The delegation provisions may impact business models, but a detailed discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> delegation provisions is beyond <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> this CBA because <strong>the</strong> Level 2<br />
Regulation has not yet been adopted.<br />
70. Additionally, AIFMs may decide to curtail investment strategies such as certain global<br />
macro and commodity trading advisor strategies that involve extensive use <strong>of</strong> FX and<br />
interest rate derivatives. The definition <strong>of</strong> leverage in <strong>the</strong> Directive is broad and requires<br />
looking through to <strong>the</strong> nominal values <strong>of</strong> derivatives. Extensive calculation and reporting<br />
<strong>of</strong> significant leverage amounts by certain AIFs may also increase <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> such<br />
strategies. Disclosure <strong>of</strong> new gross leverage amounts without historical numbers for<br />
comparison may also affect investor appetite in <strong>the</strong>se strategies.<br />
71. Currently some investment managers in <strong>the</strong> UK that are authorised under MiFID provide<br />
services to an UK-authorised operator. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> delegation provisions, some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
operators which lack investment management expertise and o<strong>the</strong>r substance required by <strong>the</strong><br />
Level 2 Regulation may no longer be able to <strong>of</strong>fer such services. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, those<br />
operators that can meet <strong>the</strong> delegation requirements may increase business by acting as<br />
AIFMs in some structures so that certain firms may remain MiFID-authorised ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
become AIFM-authorised.<br />
72. Some firms are currently performing AIFM functions as well as extensive MiFID business<br />
such as brokerage activities which are beyond <strong>the</strong> permitted MiFID business in <strong>the</strong><br />
Directive. 23 These firms will need to make changes to <strong>the</strong>ir business model, e.g. a separation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ‘prohibited’ MiFID business from <strong>the</strong>ir AIFM functions, before becoming an<br />
authorised AIFM.<br />
73. Some private equity fund managers may be affected by <strong>the</strong> prohibition against assetstripping<br />
in Article 30 AIFMD. This provision will generally prohibit asset-stripping for a<br />
period <strong>of</strong> 24 months from non-listed companies or issuers that are controlled by an AIF<br />
or a group <strong>of</strong> AIFs. This prohibition will in particular affect <strong>the</strong> business models <strong>of</strong> firms<br />
focusing on specific private equity opportunities such as management buy-out and rescue/<br />
turnaround investments.<br />
Competition impacts<br />
74. Overall, <strong>the</strong> increase in compliance costs may have <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> forcing firms to withdraw<br />
from <strong>the</strong> UK market if it is no longer pr<strong>of</strong>itable to operate here. Respondents to <strong>the</strong><br />
Deloitte firm survey indicated that compliance costs are particularly likely to affect<br />
medium-sized AIFMs above <strong>the</strong> Article 3 thresholds, as compliance costs are likely to<br />
constitute a larger proportion <strong>of</strong> total costs for <strong>the</strong>m compared to larger firms. This means<br />
that larger firms may have a cost advantage compared to <strong>the</strong> medium sized firms. Some<br />
23 Article 6(4) AIFMD<br />
A1:18 Financial Services Authority November 2012