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RA 00048.pdf - OAR@ICRISAT

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egional sense are well known. It is time to move<br />

on from these generalities to the specifics of each<br />

case.<br />

Marketing Arrangements 1<br />

Despite the importance that food crops play in the<br />

economies of the WASAT, prior to the drought of<br />

1968-73, they were almost completely neglected<br />

in government planning. This did not mean that<br />

there were no effects on the food crops. Rather,<br />

they suffered from a policy of neglect. In particular,<br />

export promotion policies which encouraged<br />

cash crops resulted in a deterioration of the food<br />

crop sector.<br />

The 1970s witnessed some important changes.<br />

There was a general shift in goverment policy<br />

objectives from producing cash crops to food<br />

crops, as emphasis was placed on food selfsufficiency.<br />

In the realm of production, extensive<br />

research began to develop improved seed<br />

varieties and better technical packages for sorghum,<br />

millet, and maize. Concurrently, these<br />

governments became aware of the potential role<br />

of marketing in general agricultural development,<br />

specifically for cereal grains. The first result of this<br />

awareness (whether for better or worse) was<br />

attempts at extensive public intervention in grain<br />

marketing. Each country set up its own grain<br />

marketing board: Mali-OPAM, Mauritania-OMC,<br />

Niger-OPVN, Senegal-ONCAD, and Upper Volta<br />

-OFNACER. 2<br />

These state agencies were established for<br />

essentially the same reasons. The production and<br />

commercialization of the staple food crops are<br />

politically as well as economically strategic sectors<br />

of the economy for state intervention and<br />

control. The economic justification for such intervention<br />

rests in the long held belief that traditional<br />

traders are monopsonists, and that this coupled<br />

with their dual role as local moneylenders, put<br />

them in a strong position to exploit the peasant<br />

both as a producer and as a consumer. His need<br />

1. For an in-depth presentation of marketing arrangements<br />

and pricing policy in the CILSS countries, the<br />

reader is referred to CILSS (1977).<br />

2. Nigeria has had a marketing agency for food crops<br />

since before independence. It is virtually ineffective<br />

in the area of grain marketing. It is not discussed in<br />

this paper.<br />

for cash soon after harvest forces him to sell to<br />

monopoly traders who offer low prices for grain.<br />

Similarly, his indebtedness to this same trader<br />

strengthens the trader's hold over him.<br />

In sum, it was (and still is) believed that private<br />

sector grain trading was heavily monopsonized<br />

and monopolized, and that economic and social<br />

forces serve to strengthen this structure and<br />

increase the inequitable division of the benefits of<br />

trade. Thus, the grain boards have as their stated<br />

objectives: (a) to offer "fairer" prices to producers<br />

while offering a reasonably priced supply of<br />

grain to urban consumers; (b) to stabilize intraannual<br />

producer prices; (c) to establish and regulate<br />

security stocks; and (d) to organize grain<br />

exports. The next section is a brief description of<br />

both state and private marketing channels.<br />

Major Marketing Channels<br />

Each of these countries now has a dual market<br />

system: state-run marketing and private trading<br />

The particular mix between the two depends on a<br />

number of factors, but in each the two systems<br />

interact. Most frequently the literature groups the<br />

market participants into such categories as:<br />

assembler, transporter, wholesaler, and retailer.<br />

Individual agents, however, often fulfill more than<br />

one function and each category has a different<br />

meaning when put into different marketing channels.<br />

The relations between the agents and the<br />

number and specific tasks depend on the region<br />

and the channel.<br />

More useful than categorizing agents, for<br />

understanding the way in which grain is marketed,<br />

are descriptions of the different types of channels<br />

through which the grain flows. 3 The marketing<br />

channels can be divided into two basic categories:<br />

grain that bypasses the market place and grain<br />

that passes through it. Within the second group<br />

are two subgroups: privately and state traded<br />

grain. Since all the grain that is marketed by the<br />

state passes through the market, this section is<br />

divided in two: state marketing arrangements and<br />

private sector trade. The latter includes grain that<br />

bypasses the market place.<br />

3. For an in-depth discussion of the functions of<br />

different agents and for a description of the various<br />

marketing channels see Wilcock and Ouedraogo (in<br />

press).<br />

648

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