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saerTaSoriso samarTlis Jurnali, #1, 2008 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, N1, 2008<br />

though that exercising universal jurisdiction may<br />

not be considered to be widely supported.<br />

Development of relatively recent notion of<br />

humanitarian intervention 62 is interesting for<br />

the purposes of this essay, as it serves as a<br />

tool of further erosion of a concept of sovereign<br />

immunity for the sake of dealing with the<br />

mass human rights atrocities in any given state<br />

after all other legal and political means have<br />

proven to be inefficient. This new concept is<br />

considered to be emerging due to the very<br />

fact that international crimes so severely violate<br />

essential human rights that it is not permissible<br />

for the international community not<br />

to intervene, even by using force and thus<br />

punish the perpetrators. Consequently a<br />

question emerges: if humanitarian intervention<br />

may be justified to protect human rights,<br />

what is so unacceptable in recognizing universal<br />

jurisdiction over international crimes and<br />

instead of letting causing even more devastating<br />

results for the general population of any<br />

given country, leaders of which might be implicated<br />

in committing international crimes, to<br />

subject these leaders to universal jurisdiction<br />

and bring them to justice in any state physically<br />

capable to do so The benefits of such<br />

change in practice seem to be the following: a<br />

criminal leader receives deserved punishment,<br />

prosecution is targeted and instead of involving<br />

risk to lives of groups, already victimized<br />

by policies or conducts of criminal leaders only<br />

those “deserving” are hold to account. In this<br />

case prosecution is targeted and victims can<br />

see that justice is served, whereas by exercising<br />

humanitarian intervention even more innocent<br />

people become victims along with those<br />

groups that might already have been victims of<br />

perpetrators.<br />

Therefore, the question remains: if humanitarian<br />

intervention can be tolerated in particularly<br />

exceptional situations, when the scale and<br />

character of perpetration is extremely abhorrent,<br />

why can not the prosecution of those<br />

protected by immunities for perpetration of<br />

international crimes by courts of other states<br />

be considered as not infringing sovereign equality<br />

of states and thus, make it possible to strip<br />

off immunities from those deserving so due to<br />

their activities, notwithstanding their rank<br />

If there is a risk of political misuse and if<br />

states need more assurance of impartiality<br />

than this can be guaranteed by a national<br />

court of any given state, the Security Council<br />

of the United Nations may be entrusted to make<br />

a decision over criminal leaders and situations<br />

they create and recognize them subjected to<br />

“universal jurisdiction”, as their activities inflict<br />

gross human rights atrocities, causing “threat<br />

to international peace and security”.<br />

Whatever motivation behind and justification<br />

for humanitarian intervention, it may not<br />

be considered to be fitting any of the recognized<br />

concepts of jurisdiction. It can not be<br />

argued that by possibly developing this concept<br />

further and making it a rule of international<br />

law, even if used in very exceptional situations,<br />

it would cause less harm to state sovereignty<br />

than recognition of exercise of universal<br />

jurisdiction over international crimes, disregarding<br />

the status of the perpetrator. The<br />

development of international and human rights<br />

laws evidence the need for progressive development<br />

of universally recognized principles.<br />

Thus, a signal stemming from the emerging<br />

concept of humanitarian intervention, that<br />

mass human rights violations may serve as a<br />

good cause to disregard sovereign equality<br />

of states and intervene in seemingly “domestic”<br />

matters, may lead to a conclusion that at<br />

the current stage of development of the concept<br />

of human rights protection it may perfectly<br />

be possible to subject even the highest ranking<br />

perpetrators of international crimes to universal<br />

jurisdiction along with already existing<br />

possibilities of prosecution, including the prosecution<br />

according to the “complementarity”<br />

principle 63 of the International Criminal Court 64 .<br />

Therefore, the conclusion follows: if there<br />

is a real political will and devotion to the protection<br />

of human beings from atrocities, constituting<br />

international crimes, there will be a<br />

possibility to find way out from a maze of protection<br />

of sovereign immunity and sovereign<br />

equality notions and bring perpetrators of international<br />

crimes to justice as deserved, to<br />

serve the interests of justice, to work as deterrent<br />

for future atrocities and to give survived<br />

victims at least a bit of hope of the future.<br />

V. AFTER ALL THE ABOVE DISCUSSED, WHAT DID<br />

COURT RULE IN THE PINOCHET CASE<br />

Due to the limited format of the essay, the<br />

content of the case 65 will not be considered in<br />

details: a limited discussion of the case will<br />

suffice for the purposes of the essay. The<br />

case has been selected due to the following<br />

72

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