Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Departments of Health and Human Services and AgricultureIn 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment reported that a single airplane delivering100 kilograms of anthrax spores by aerosol on a clear, calm night over the Washington,D.C., area could kill between one million and three million people. 17 Two key players in ourefforts to meet the challenges presented by the threat of biological weapons are theDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Agriculture.These departments’ proliferation-related resources mainly involve response to an attackagainst the U.S. civilian population or economy, a subject beyond the scope of theCommission’s charter. 18 However, these departments perform substantial work that doesbear directly on WMD issues relevant to the Commission’s inquiry. Furthermore, actionstaken by these departments (such as efforts to establish better communications with thetraditional national security community) underscore the significance of their WMD-relatedwork to the Commission’s charter.Department of Health and Human ServicesHHS’s unique resources include the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Public Health Service, and the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA). HHS’s fiscal year 1999 budget for bioterrorism preparedness is $158million, with a proposed increase in the President’s fiscal 2000 budget to $230 million. HHSorganizes its bioterrorism efforts into five areas:• Disease surveillance and public health network• Medical consequence management• National pharmaceutical stockpile• Research and development (R&D)• Deterrence17Richard K. Betts. “The New Threat of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 77, January/February 1998, page 26.18Because Congress prohibited the Commission from studying domestic response capabilities,such issues as developing a national communications network, upgrading medical and emergencyresponse capabilities, conducting threat/risk/benefit assessments for stockpiling vaccines andmedicines, development of interim measures until such stockpiles are in place, and stepsnecessary to mitigate “culture clash” between the various cooperating agencies were not studied.These issues need to be addressed in order to develop an overall coherent, complete strategy forcombating proliferation.89