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Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Similarly, the Commission assessed particular agency and interagency efforts to developtechnologies that could advance our efforts to combat proliferation, as well as the presentprocedures for deciding which technologies are pursued, in what form, and with whichresources. For example, development <strong>of</strong> biological-agent detectors has been a prioritysince the Gulf War, but the fielding <strong>of</strong> these systems remains slow. The Commissionconsidered whether the work under way sufficiently addresses the varied needs <strong>of</strong>potential users, users such as state and local <strong>of</strong>ficials, international inspectors, clandestineintelligence collectors, those responsible for protecting Americans overseas at U.S.embassies, and deployed military forces.Finally, the Commission sought to determine the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> bilateral and multilateralproliferation-related cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations.The range <strong>of</strong> international cooperative activities spans diplomacy, military, commercial, lawenforcement, and intelligence, in both bilateral and multilateral relationships. Becauseproliferation concerns are global and are so interconnected with other transnationalsecurity challenges, such as terrorism, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and crisismanagement and response, an appropriate policy response clearly includes cooperationwith international partners.The Commission’s deliberations took place within the context <strong>of</strong> the broad nature <strong>of</strong> theproliferation threat, including the potential for WMD use within American borders. However,the legislation establishing the Commission prohibited us from reviewing or assessing U.S.domestic response preparedness and capabilities. The Commission believes that aneffective capability to respond to the use <strong>of</strong> nuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons by states or sub-national groups, whether at home or abroad, is critical notonly in the event <strong>of</strong> an attack, but also for its deterrent effect. The Commissionbelieves these issues should be integrated.This report presents the findings and recommendations <strong>of</strong> the Commission’s work.viii

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