Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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• The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency is responsible forthe publication of the doctrine on employment of nuclear weapons found inthe Joint Chiefs of Staff publication 3-12 series and for the integratedspecific military requirements list for nuclear research activities that isrevalidated and published annually. However, there is no intraagencycoordination of this priority list with the Joint Warfighting CapabilitiesAssessment priority list process.• The Soldier Biological and Chemical Defense Command receives itsresponsibilities for the execution of DoD’s chemical and biological defenseprogram initiatives from Public Law 103-160. Intraagency coordination isaccomplished through the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s NuclearBiological and Chemical Steering Committee/Sub-organization structuredescribed below.Intra- and Interagency Activities for Combating WMD ProliferationAs there are many committees and sub-groups that participate in preparing requirementsfor and executing the DoD programs to combat proliferation, the Commission believes thatthose identified below only constitute a partial list. Nowhere in this process does thereappear to be anyone “in charge” with the charter and necessary resources to develop anoverall architecture to assure that DoD can accomplish its primary mission in the face ofthe proliferation threat. This has implications for the larger architectural issues that confrontthe Federal Government, including its responsibilities to the states and local “firstresponders” (e.g., via the National Guard and Reserves) that would be critically importantin a crisis event involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Furthermore, thisdefocused process is not well-framed as a means of stimulating change in an oftenresistantbureaucracy responsible for formulating policy, requirements, plans, andprograms.• The Counter-proliferation Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary ofDefense, provides senior-level oversight of Department of Defense-wideefforts to train, exercise, and equip U.S. forces for the counter-proliferationmission. The Council also oversees Department of Defense counterproliferationactivities in interagency and international forums. The effortswith the international community focus on the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s (NATO) Joint Committee on Proliferation; and concentrateon: improved intelligence/information sharing, coordination of threatreduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, improving defense anddeterrence programs, and response to chemical and biological warfareattacks against civilian populations.48
• The Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) is acongressionally mandated committee that was created to identify, review,and foster interagency program integration with several proliferation-relatedpurposes including the specific charter to include efforts to stem theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of the major products ofthe Counter-proliferation Program Review Committee is the Areas forCapabilities Enhancements with priorities from the Department of Defense,Department of Energy (DoE) and Intelligence Community (IC). Should theCommission’s recommendation for an Assistant Secretary of Defense forCombating Proliferation be adopted, the legislative requirements for theCPRC should be re-examined. For 1999, the Areas for CapabilitiesEnhancements are shown in the table below.ACE Priorities Areas For Capability Enhancements for 1999Department DoE ICof Defense1 - - Individual and Collective Protection Against NBC Agents to EnableSustained Operations on the NBC Battlefield2 - - Medical Protection Against NBC Agents, to Include Vaccine StockpileAvailability3 3 2 Detection, Identification, Characterization, and Warning of CW/BW Agents4 - 8 Ballistic Missile Active Defense5 - - Provide Decontamination Capabilities on the Battlefield and in the JointRear Area6 2 5 Support for Special Operations Forces and Defense Against Paramilitary,Covert Delivery and Terrorist NBC Threats7 - 12 Cruise Missile Defense8 7 1 Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Actionable Intelligence toCounter Proliferation9 1 4 Detection, Tracking, and Protection of NBC/M and NBC/M-Related Materialsand Components10 - 6 Target Planning for NBC/M Targets11 - 7 Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of Underground Facilities with MinimalCollateral Effects12 6 3 Detection, Characterization, and Defeat of NBC/M Facilities with MinimalCollateral Effects13 - 11 Prompt Mobile Target Detection and Defeat14 4 - Provide Consequence Management for Terrorist Use of NBC Weapons(Including Support to Domestic Consequence Management)15 8 10 Support Export Control Activities of the U.S. Government16 5 9 Support Inspection and Monitoring Activities of Arms Control Agreementsand Regimes49
Page 1:
CombatingProliferation ofWeapons of
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ContentsExecutive Summary vIntroduc
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Executive SummaryEvery American sho
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Similarly, the Commission assessed
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ole as a supplier of ballistic miss
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economic, political, and diplomatic
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Sixth, we must prepare for the thre
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82A (45p x 55p)
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An improved mechanism for White Hou
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esolved before the meetings occur.
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In advising the President and ViceP
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Recommendation 2.3: The President s
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Chapter 3Managing the Interagency P
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the CPC will need to set program re
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Agency Budget ProcessesRecommendati
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The Persian Gulf War gave vivid war
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One example of poor coordination is
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The lengthy time required for techn
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• facilitating other countries’
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efficiently among the departments,
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organizations about proliferation t
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The Proper Role of Export Controls
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Second, many of the countries that
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function is shared as a statutory r
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coherent and effective non-prolifer
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and training opportunities that wil
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The Commission believes this reorga
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Responding to Proliferation that Ha
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Recommendation 5.4: The National Di
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545B (45p x 28p)
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• Second, DoD elements are still
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(3) Maintain the regional responsib
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5C (45p x 33p)61
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and related areas (such as instrume
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Recommendation 5.10: DOE’s prolif
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While there has been considerable p
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Recommendation 5.13: The President
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Recommendation 5.16: The Director o
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own export control system. This eff
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For a variety of reasons, however,
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In theory, all goods leaving or ent
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Committee on Foreign Investment in
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context. The results of this assess
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when grand jury secrecy no longer a
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The FBI’s National Security Divis
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Commission notes that the FBI has i
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Departments of Health and Human Ser
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Department of AgricultureThe Depart
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As discussed in Chapter 3, collabor
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SEC. 711. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSI
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(C) existing arrangements governing
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serve without compensation in addit
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(a) Extension of Deadline for Submi
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on the Senate Budget and Commerce,
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106
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Richard K. BettsCouncil on Foreign
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William CohenSecretary of DefenseCo
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EWilliam EckertDepartment of StateR
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Thomas GrahamSecond Choice Foundati
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Robert JosephDirector for Counterpr
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Jacob L. LewDirectorOffice of Manag
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Michael MoodiePresidentChemical and
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Paul RobinsonPresident and Laborato
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Owen J. SheaksSpecial AdvisorVerifi
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Bonni G. TischlerAssistant Commissi
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Gillian WoollettAssociate VP for Bi
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7. List and describe the authoritie
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17. What deficiencies and strengths
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Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordina
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Groups Addressing WMD Accident, Eme
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IAEA Steering CommitteeChair: State
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Title (Legislation that Contains Re
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Appendix G: Resource Allocation—B
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Department of State• NDF• NIS e
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Department of Agriculture• Select
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AbbreviationsAGARSCBRNCDCCFIUSCPDCT
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Appendix H: Technology AcquisitionA
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to change; up-to-date data should b
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this activity: the Materials Protec
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National Goal: Military Action (Inc
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• PE 602715BR: Hard Target Defeat
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• Active defensesTechnology Progr
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that provides an order-of-magnitude
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Additional ViewsAdditional Views of
Page 183 and 184: The following is a brief outline of
Page 185 and 186: Additional Views of Margo D. B. Car
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Page 189 and 190: policies through a briefing schedul
Page 191 and 192: The current Senior Director, as wit
Page 193 and 194: Although responsibility for prolife
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Page 197 and 198: Treaty negotiations, U.S. nuclear p
Page 199 and 200: • integrated national policies fo
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Page 203 and 204: A small secretariat guides the day-
Page 205 and 206: U.S.-Russia Proliferation Issues in
Page 207 and 208: and procedures; assessing competing
Page 209 and 210: Senate, and who is also dual-hatted
Page 211 and 212: Department of StateThe Non-prolifer
Page 213 and 214: (CTBT). The Verification and Compli
Page 215 and 216: The Science Centers are established
Page 217 and 218: Enhancing Export Controls 3Demilita
Page 219 and 220: KazakhstanRussiaStrategic Offensive
Page 221 and 222: UkraineThis assistance is to preven
Page 223 and 224: esource management, and to improve
Page 225 and 226: This expansion will cover the secur
Page 227 and 228: esearch and development in areas su
Page 229 and 230: warfighting plans are developed in
Page 231 and 232: The office of the Assistant Secreta
Page 233: Directive 5134.9, and is responsibl
Page 237 and 238: 4 Mitigate the Effects of WMD Use5
Page 239 and 240: U.S. Army Top Ranked Specific Milit
Page 241 and 242: • The Director, Defense Research
Page 243 and 244: Technology—has primary oversight
Page 245 and 246: • Recommendation 1 to reinforce t
Page 247 and 248: AEC’s successor agencies, the Dep
Page 249 and 250: Components of NN-40 include the Int
Page 251 and 252: ensure excess fissile material no l
Page 253 and 254: X07, 18x24• participate with the
Page 255 and 256: Nuclear Regulatory CommissionBackgr
Page 257 and 258: Office of International Programs. T
Page 259 and 260: The Intelligence CommunityThe Intel
Page 261 and 262: The DCI Nonproliferation Center, un
Page 263 and 264: Findings of the Aspin-Brown and Jer
Page 265 and 266: Department of CommerceThe Bureau of
Page 267 and 268: Office of Exporter Services. In add
Page 269 and 270: The OC weighs the intelligence info
Page 271 and 272: important weapon in BXA’s arsenal
Page 273 and 274: Non-proliferation and Export Contro
Page 275 and 276: The Customs Service’s response to
Page 277 and 278: An additional benefit to the Bureau
Page 279: The Exon-Florio provision does not
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Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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