Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The FBI’s National Security Division has added proliferation to its National Security ThreatList and in January 1999 established a unit to address the acquisition of U.S. technologyfor the development of weapons of mass destruction by foreign countries. The FBI hascontracted with the Department of Energy to utilize the expertise of the nationallaboratories to identify technologies and industry sectors which might be targets for statesand sub-state actors bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and/or relatedproduction capability. In conjunction with the laboratories, the FBI has worked to developan initial assessment of the scope and breadth of proliferation activities and is working withother agencies in an effort to thwart the acquisition of WMD-related materials, equipment,information, or technology from the United States.Several attempts to acquire actual chemical, biological, or nuclear devices by foreigncountries have been identified. However, the predominant number of cases involvesacquisition of U.S. dual-use technology designed to give a nation the infrastructure for anindigenous weapons program. The FBI works closely with the Intelligence Community (IC)and utilizes the expertise of agents from the Department of Commerce and the U.S.Customs Service in these cases.The Criminal Division is responsible for pursuing the investigation and prosecution of thosewho violate U.S. laws relating to the trafficking in and/or use of weapons of massdestruction against U.S. persons. The Criminal Division is supported by theCounterterrorism Center (CTC) within the National Security Division at FBI headquarters.The CTC brings together representatives of twenty different law-enforcement and ICagencies, and provides intelligence and threat analysis information about the threat of useof weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups to the appropriate law-enforcementunits.These various FBI units report up distinct chains of command, and they do not all cometogether until well up the chain. This is especially true of investigations and intelligenceunits within the FBI. While the legal authorities and constitutional requirements aredifferent for each, this separation within the FBI leads to stovepiping of information andinefficient information sharing regarding WMD activities of foreign entities in the UnitedStates.Recommendation 5.30: The FBI should designate a single program manager tocoordinate the efforts of all units within the FBI with responsibility for combating theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manager should be closeenough to the actual operation to identify priorities, coordinate activities, andensure information sharing.85