Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Additional Views of Margo D. B. Carlisle, Steven Cambone, 31 Henry F. Cooper,William Schneider, Jr., and Henry SokolskiThe Commission's work has addressed a crucial issue of public policy and nationalsecurity—the organization of the Federal government to combat the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The threat posed to the UnitedStates by proliferation has intensified dramatically in recent years. A recent independentreview of the proliferation threat led by former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeldobserved that the threat has matured so rapidly, that the United States could be subjectedto WMD attack in the near future “with little or no warning.” 32 It is not surprising that this isso. The Commission has concluded that the efforts of the US government to combatproliferation today are neither effective nor command an appropriately high policy priorityin the Executive branch of government.The Commission's recommendations engage two broad areas of governmentorganization. The first is the organization of government departments and agencies toperform their respective functions in combating proliferation. The performance ofgovernment agencies in the implementation of their mission to combat proliferation isuneven. The effectiveness of some agencies such as the Department of State have shownsigns of improvement, while other agencies such as the Department of Energy havesuffered a vertiginous decline. In the case of the Department of Energy, fundamentalchanges in management of nuclear proliferation-related functions in the Department areneeded. We agree with the PFIAB's recommendation that an as an autonomous entity beformed either within the Department similar to the DOD's Advanced Research ProjectsAgency, or as an independent non-cabinet agency similar to the former Atomic EnergyCommission. We prefer either of these suggestions to the Commission's proposedreorganization under an assistant secretary. We agree that the performance ofgovernment departments and agencies is crucial to a successful government-wide effortto combat proliferation. From a programmatic perspective, the ability of the government tocombat proliferation will not necessarily be improved simply by applying additionalresources to existing programs. However, we believe that the Commission's organizationalrecommendations will enable departments and agencies to better employ existingresources, and effectively use additional resources if they become available in the futureto combat proliferation. Future administrations will benefit from the implementation ofthese recommendations.The second dimension of the Commission's recommendations concerns the managementand leadership of the interagency process. The Commission's recommends creation of anew position within the National Security Council staff to manage the interagencyapparatus to combat proliferation. The official would be empowered with extraordinary31Nominated32Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States: Executive Summary,(Washington: GPO, 1998).173