Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Regulatory CommissionBackgroundThe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established by the EnergyReorganization Act of 1974, which abolished the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).The fundamental premise of the Act was that the AEC faced an inherent conflict of interestsince it both promoted civil nuclear energy programs and regulated them in the interest ofpublic safety. In broad terms, then, the NRC inherited the Atomic Energy Commission’sregulatory functions, while its other functions were passed to the Energy Research andDevelopment Administration, and later to the Department of Energy.The five NRC Commissioners are appointed for set terms of office, and cannot be removedexcept for cause. Appointments are made by the President with Senate confirmation. TheChairman of the Commission is designated by the President, and serves as its principalexecutive officer. As an independent regulatory commission, the NRC does not report tothe President and is not (with one exception noted below) subject to direction from theexecutive branch of government. The general NRC budget does not come fromappropriated funds, but from license fees. (Some proliferation-related activity, such asassistance to civil nuclear activities in the former Soviet Union, is paid for throughappropriated funds.)Congress modeled the NRC on other federal regulatory commissions, such as theInterstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, or theFederal Trade Commission. Many such commissions were created in the Progressive andNew Deal eras, with broad powers to regulate specific sectors of the economy. The theorywas that the subject matter dealt with by each commission required the application ofexpert judgment that could only be developed over time. The public interest, it wasbelieved, also required that this expert judgment be exercised free of political influence orconflicts of interest. Former NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky, testifying before theCommission, pointed to this independence of judgment as the primary strength of theNRC. He noted, for example, that as early as 1981, the NRC was able to raise questionsabout the adequacy of IAEA safeguards, at a time when such questions were virtuallytaboo elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy.Historically, independent regulatory commissions gave much of their attention to rate-fixingand other economic regulation. Over the last 20 years, however, economic regulation haspassed out of favor and free-market pricing has been extended to formerly regulatedeconomic sectors. The work of some independent commissions has been cut back, whileothers, including the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board,have been abolished.69