Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

and related areas (such as instrumentation), and the government is understandably thesingle developer and supplier of nuclear weapons. However, in the areas of chemistry andbiology, DOE has peers in universities and the private sector.DOE is good at sponsoring work in the laboratory system that supports its missions, but isless adept at competing work between the laboratories and industry or universities. TheCommission stressed in Chapter 3 that the US Government program must includeconsideration of the entire life cycle of technology, from research and development throughprocurement, testing, and field deployment. For chemical and biological agent andweapons detection, protection, and treatment, the problem of procurement, testing, anddeployment is as demanding and more costly than developing new technology. TheCommission believes it is important that DOE’s development program not proceed inisolation from a government-wide acquisition plan that involves other agencies responsiblefor addressing the procurement and acquisition issue. Without such integration, there is adanger that DOE (or other agencies) may develop new technology that is not used, or maysponsor similar projects in several different laboratories, as has happened in the past. TheCommission found examples of chemical and biological agent detection projects andcomputer software systems designed to serve a possible proliferation end use that wereproceeding in parallel. The result is that significant resources are devoted to technologydevelopment with greater duplication than desirable, and with little or no attention tofielding new capabilities.DOE assistance to Russia on MPC&A provides an important example of shortfalls that canoccur when there is an exclusive focus on technology. DOE has been successful in helpingMINATOM, the Russian nuclear agency, obtain MPC&A systems. However, the assistanceprogram does not include any support, either financial or technical, for deployment,operation, and maintenance of these systems. The result is that, in some instances,installed systems are neither used nor maintained, thus vitiating the purpose of this criticalCooperative Threat Reduction effort.The Commission believes that DOE should focus its policy and program efforts oncombating nuclear proliferation, and should shift its focus on chemical and biologicalproliferation to one of supporting the requirements of other agencies and easing theiraccess to its laboratories. Our recommendations are intended to accomplish this.Recommendation 5.8: Responsibility for combating nuclear proliferation shouldbe consolidated under one Assistant Secretary of Energy (ASE).63