Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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diversion of weapons of mass destruction and constituent materials, and (4) countering thepotential use of chemical and biological weapons. The program develops applicabletechnologies, demonstrates and validates fieldable prototypes, and, in the treatymonitoring area, provides actual operational hardware and software. Most of thetechnologies developed within the program are intended to support the operational needsof other USG agencies. The program also provides the science and technology base thatenables other DOE Nonproliferation and National Security organizations to accomplishtheir missions.The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) was created in October 1994 to overseeDOE’s activities to dispose of inventories of U.S. weapons-usable plutonium and highlyenriched uranium declared excess to national defense needs and to provide technicalsupport for Administration efforts to obtain Russia’s agreement to reciprocal actions for thedisposition of its surplus plutonium. The Office is headed by a director who reports to boththe Under and Deputy Secretaries of Energy. Key programs administered by MD involvetransferring surplus HEU to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation for downblending and use ascommercial reactor fuel, designing a plutonium pit disassembly and conversion facility anda mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, reducing the number of sites where surplus plutoniumis stored, and conducting small-scale tests and demonstrations of plutonium dispositiontechnologies with Russia. Through these activities, MD plays an important role in helpingto reduce the nuclear danger associated with increases in stockpiles of surplus weaponsmaterials resulting from downsizing of the nuclear weapons complex and weaponsdismantling. The fiscal year 2000 budget request for these activities is $200 million, anincrease of $32.5 million over the fiscal year 1999 comparable amount. This increase isprimarily to allow the program to begin design of a key U.S. plutonium disposition facility toimmobilize surplus non-pit plutonium, to procure lead test assembly equipment requiredfor mixed oxide fuel irradiation tests, and to hire the field staff necessary to overseeplutonium disposition facility design activities at the selected DOE site.The Office of Intelligence (IN) provides technical nuclear weapons expertise, nuclearproliferation-related analysis, and intelligence collection support to the intelligence andpolicy communities, as well as operational support to defense and civilian operationalteams. In addition to its headquarters team, it draws upon the resource base of the nationallaboratories to provide technical analysis of all aspects of foreign nuclear programs, andto solve especially difficult and intractable intelligence questions. Two units within IN haveprimary responsibility for non-proliferation issues: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Division(NND) and the Special Technologies Program (STP), which seeks to develop and fieldquick-turnaround, specialized technology applications to meet the needs of theintelligence, special operations and law-enforcement communities. The director of the INreports directly to the Secretary of Energy.Executive Order 12333 identifies DOE as a member of the Intelligence Community andexpressly charges the Secretary of Energy to:66
X07, 18x24• participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information withrespect to foreign energy matters,• produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary’sresponsibilities,• participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirementswhere the special capability of the Department can contribute, and• provide expert technical, analytical, and research capability to otheragencies within the Intelligence Community.The Office of Intelligence implements the Department’s intelligence responsibilitiesthrough a variety of activities:• producing and coordinating intelligence analyses,• tasking in-depth technical analyses and preliminary technologydevelopment to DOE’s field organizations,• managing Intelligence Work for Others at these organizations,67
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CombatingProliferation ofWeapons of
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ContentsExecutive Summary vIntroduc
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Executive SummaryEvery American sho
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Similarly, the Commission assessed
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ole as a supplier of ballistic miss
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economic, political, and diplomatic
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Sixth, we must prepare for the thre
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82A (45p x 55p)
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An improved mechanism for White Hou
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esolved before the meetings occur.
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In advising the President and ViceP
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Recommendation 2.3: The President s
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Chapter 3Managing the Interagency P
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the CPC will need to set program re
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Agency Budget ProcessesRecommendati
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The Persian Gulf War gave vivid war
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One example of poor coordination is
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The lengthy time required for techn
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• facilitating other countries’
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efficiently among the departments,
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organizations about proliferation t
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The Proper Role of Export Controls
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Second, many of the countries that
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function is shared as a statutory r
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coherent and effective non-prolifer
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and training opportunities that wil
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The Commission believes this reorga
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Responding to Proliferation that Ha
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Recommendation 5.4: The National Di
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545B (45p x 28p)
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• Second, DoD elements are still
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(3) Maintain the regional responsib
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5C (45p x 33p)61
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and related areas (such as instrume
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Recommendation 5.10: DOE’s prolif
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While there has been considerable p
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Recommendation 5.13: The President
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Recommendation 5.16: The Director o
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own export control system. This eff
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For a variety of reasons, however,
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In theory, all goods leaving or ent
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Committee on Foreign Investment in
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context. The results of this assess
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when grand jury secrecy no longer a
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The FBI’s National Security Divis
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Commission notes that the FBI has i
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Departments of Health and Human Ser
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Department of AgricultureThe Depart
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As discussed in Chapter 3, collabor
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SEC. 711. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSI
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(C) existing arrangements governing
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serve without compensation in addit
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(a) Extension of Deadline for Submi
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on the Senate Budget and Commerce,
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106
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Richard K. BettsCouncil on Foreign
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William CohenSecretary of DefenseCo
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EWilliam EckertDepartment of StateR
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Thomas GrahamSecond Choice Foundati
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Robert JosephDirector for Counterpr
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Jacob L. LewDirectorOffice of Manag
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Michael MoodiePresidentChemical and
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Paul RobinsonPresident and Laborato
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Owen J. SheaksSpecial AdvisorVerifi
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Bonni G. TischlerAssistant Commissi
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Gillian WoollettAssociate VP for Bi
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7. List and describe the authoritie
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17. What deficiencies and strengths
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Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordina
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Groups Addressing WMD Accident, Eme
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IAEA Steering CommitteeChair: State
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Title (Legislation that Contains Re
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Appendix G: Resource Allocation—B
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Department of State• NDF• NIS e
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Department of Agriculture• Select
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AbbreviationsAGARSCBRNCDCCFIUSCPDCT
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Appendix H: Technology AcquisitionA
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to change; up-to-date data should b
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this activity: the Materials Protec
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National Goal: Military Action (Inc
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• PE 602715BR: Hard Target Defeat
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• Active defensesTechnology Progr
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that provides an order-of-magnitude
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Additional ViewsAdditional Views of
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The following is a brief outline of
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Additional Views of Margo D. B. Car
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Annex:Organizational OverviewsExecu
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policies through a briefing schedul
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The current Senior Director, as wit
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Although responsibility for prolife
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• the Under Secretary of Defense
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Treaty negotiations, U.S. nuclear p
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• integrated national policies fo
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Page 207 and 208: and procedures; assessing competing
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Page 211 and 212: Department of StateThe Non-prolifer
Page 213 and 214: (CTBT). The Verification and Compli
Page 215 and 216: The Science Centers are established
Page 217 and 218: Enhancing Export Controls 3Demilita
Page 219 and 220: KazakhstanRussiaStrategic Offensive
Page 221 and 222: UkraineThis assistance is to preven
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Page 225 and 226: This expansion will cover the secur
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Page 231 and 232: The office of the Assistant Secreta
Page 233 and 234: Directive 5134.9, and is responsibl
Page 235 and 236: • The Counter-proliferation Progr
Page 237 and 238: 4 Mitigate the Effects of WMD Use5
Page 239 and 240: U.S. Army Top Ranked Specific Milit
Page 241 and 242: • The Director, Defense Research
Page 243 and 244: Technology—has primary oversight
Page 245 and 246: • Recommendation 1 to reinforce t
Page 247 and 248: AEC’s successor agencies, the Dep
Page 249 and 250: Components of NN-40 include the Int
Page 251: ensure excess fissile material no l
Page 255 and 256: Nuclear Regulatory CommissionBackgr
Page 257 and 258: Office of International Programs. T
Page 259 and 260: The Intelligence CommunityThe Intel
Page 261 and 262: The DCI Nonproliferation Center, un
Page 263 and 264: Findings of the Aspin-Brown and Jer
Page 265 and 266: Department of CommerceThe Bureau of
Page 267 and 268: Office of Exporter Services. In add
Page 269 and 270: The OC weighs the intelligence info
Page 271 and 272: important weapon in BXA’s arsenal
Page 273 and 274: Non-proliferation and Export Contro
Page 275 and 276: The Customs Service’s response to
Page 277 and 278: An additional benefit to the Bureau
Page 279: The Exon-Florio provision does not
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Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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