11.07.2015 Views

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Responding to <strong>Proliferation</strong> that Has Already OccurredRecommendation 5.2: The National Director, working with the Under Secretary <strong>of</strong>State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, should conduct anorganizational and resource review to identify the changes and resources neededto take advantage <strong>of</strong> opportunities to prevent proliferation or to mitigate theconsequences <strong>of</strong> proliferation that has already occurred.State and ACDA historically emphasized efforts to prevent proliferation or to deny WMDcapabilities to other countries rather than to marshal instruments to address significantproliferation that had already occurred. Thus, the Department traditionally has been slowto react to the rapidly changing proliferation problem, for example in Iraq, Iran, and NorthKorea. This must change. ACDA’s leadership in establishing and institutionalizingprocesses used by the US Government for treaty formulation, negotiation, advocacy andverification, enforcement, and evidence collection may now help the Department toaddress these issues, but it is not clear that the reorganization will provide the increasingemphasis on addressing existing proliferation deemed necessary by the Commission.The review should address all the multilateral and bilateral instruments that areavailable to the United States to deal with the foreign policy aspects <strong>of</strong> proliferation,both to prevent or deter proliferation and to deal with it once it has occurred. India,Pakistan, North Korea, and, potentially, Iraq and Iran are central examples <strong>of</strong> the latter. Inassessing the results <strong>of</strong> this review, the National Director should bear in mind that, as withall efforts to combat proliferation, these potential sources <strong>of</strong> leverage will be far lesseffective if they are exercised unilaterally than if we can gain multilateral cooperation. Therange <strong>of</strong> instruments that should be examined includes, but is not limited to:• Foreign assistance• Security assistance• Arms transfers• Security guarantees• Cooperative WMD programs <strong>of</strong> all agencies• Trade and economic assistance• Regulation <strong>of</strong> access to global markets, including:50

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