Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Exon-Florio provision does not define “national security,” but the conference reportthat accompanied it noted that the term was to be interpreted broadly. Exon-Florio doesprovide that the government may consider, among other factors, the “potential effects ofthe proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technologyto any country” identified by the Secretary of State as a “country of concern regardingmissile proliferation,” or “the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons” or the saleof military goods, equipment, or technology to a country on the “Nuclear Non-ProliferationSpecial Country List.” This indicates that WMD proliferation should be considered withinCFIUS’s jurisdiction. However, the reference to sales of “military goods, equipment, ortechnology” could be interpreted to mean that dual-use equipment and technology is notwithin the Committee’s purview. Moreover, the use of the term “sales” is troubling, sincemost countries that pursue WMD programs attempt to develop an indigenous capability toproduce such weapons, rather than seeking to buy WMD outright. The “sales” referencealso overlooks the possibility that countries or groups will acquire WMD technologythrough espionage rather than commercial channels.93