Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Department of DefenseThe Department of Defense (DoD) has the most resources applied to the widest variety ofprograms for combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means ofdelivery. DoD combats proliferation by (1) the application of military power to protect UnitedStates forces and interests, (2) intelligence collection and analysis, and (3) support todiplomacy, arms control, and export controls. It is the only agency involved in all aspectsof responding to the WMD threat, including prevention, deterrence, defense, and limitingthe damage in case of use. It must be organized to support not only its own effort, but alsothe government-wide efforts described in Chapter 2.Impact of the Defense Reform Initiative on Proliferation PolicyResponsibilities for combating proliferation are too diffuse. Below the level of theDeputy Secretary, there is no institutional means of integrating the multitude ofseparate activities.The Secretary of Defense’s November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) includedseveral organizational changes intended to raise the priority of DoD proliferation-relatedactivities and to improve the Department’s overall performance in this area. Since then:• The position of Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy has beenabolished and its functions, including proliferation policy, transferred to the AssistantSecretary for Strategy and Resources (renamed Assistant Secretary for Strategy andThreat Reduction).• A new Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has brought together under asingle Director several agencies dealing with emerging threats: the Defense SpecialWeapons Agency (formerly, the Defense Nuclear Agency), On-Site InspectionAgency, Defense Technology Security Administration, Center for VerificationResearch and elements responsible for implementing the Cooperative ThreatReduction program.• Congress stopped the Secretary of Defense from abolishing the post of Assistant tothe Secretary for Atomic Energy (later for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense)–previously a key advisor on these programs—although the position remains unfilled.In spite of these developments, responsibility for proliferation-related issues in DoDremains so diffused as to make it impossible to determine who—below the DeputySecretary—has the authority and the responsibility to integrate plans, policy, requirementsand programs. No one seems to be “in charge” of combating proliferation and, in anorganization as large and complex as DoD, that is a serious problem.53