Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Many present and past officials have indicated that the coordination of proliferation-relatedprograms has often failed to meet these standards. The Commission has identified severalareas in which interagency activities are deficient. These have common features:• overlapping responsibility and resource requirements: When a new probleminvolves identifying available resources or the development of a coordinated responsefrom several agencies, the process is cumbersome and slow, and is further hamperedby a lack of resource flexibility. Disputes that should be resolved promptly at theworking level must often be resolved instead at meetings of deputy secretaries orCabinet-level officials.• no end-to-end interagency plan for addressing proliferation: There is noproliferation-related architecture—an end-to-end plan for policy development,program planning, and budget formulation—nor does any person or staff have thepower or responsibility to develop one.• absence of a cross-cutting budget for program elements related toproliferation: Neither the President, Congress, nor any executive branch officialknows how much the various agencies have spent on these efforts or how much theyplan to spend in the future. The private sector has an apt expression: “If you don’tmeasure it, you can’t manage it.” Without an explicit financial plan tied toprogrammatic objectives, individual agencies and the corresponding sub-committeeson Capitol Hill make their program and resource decisions independently of anyoverall plan or objective. The result is not only inefficiency and duplication but alsopotentially catastrophic delay.The President’s National Security Advisor has the broadest perspective on theproliferation threat, but with all of his other responsibilities he cannot be expected tomanage the government’s proliferation-related programs on a daily basis. With no onespecifically in charge of all proliferation-related efforts, no one is ultimately accountable tothe President and to Congress. Thus, the present system lets agencies protect theirperceived institutional interests rather than fully contributing to an overall plan for achievingbroader objectives. Blame can be deflected and diffusedother participants in theinteragency process. Such diffuse responsibility invites inefficiency and ineffectiveness,and avoids accountability.Assessing the Need for ChangeThe nation lacks a comprehensive policy and plan to meet the threat posedby the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.A coordinated, consistent, and coherent response to proliferation-related threats requiresconcerted changes in all three elements of the current system: the interagency process,the individual departments and agencies, and Congress.9