Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Department of EnergyThe Department of Energy (DOE) plays a key role in combating proliferation. Because ofits expertise in nuclear weapons and nuclear power, DOE has greater knowledge than anyother agency in dealing with matters of nuclear proliferation. It manages the nationallaboratories, including the three national weapons laboratories, Los Alamos NationalLaboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratoriesand the manufacturing complex for nuclear weapons. These have extraordinarytechnological capabilities that, if properly harnessed, can contribute enormously to allaspects of combating proliferation.The Commission’s review of DOE’s proliferation-related activities occurred during theperiod when major counterintelligence and security problems were made public. Since thattime, there have been several independent reviews and recommendations for significantchanges in the management of the weapons programs and of the national labs mostclosely associated with nuclear weapons. In general, the Commission is in sympathy withthe views of the recent report of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board(PFIAB). Along those lines, the recommendations that the Commission makes seek tofocus DOE more closely on nuclear proliferation-related activities in which the labs haveunique experience. The Commission endorses the PFIAB’s recommendation to place theOffice of Nonproliferation and National Security under a new Under Secretary of Energy,if such an office is created.DOE and its predecessor agencies, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the EnergyResearch & Development Administration (ERDA), have a long history in nuclearproliferation matters. In the 1950s and 1960s, the AEC was the principal agencyimplementing “Atoms for Peace,” a policy aimed at providing civilian nuclear technologyassistance to nations willing to forswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons. During thisperiod and until India’s nuclear explosion in 1974, the AEC, and later ERDA, alsosupported policies today considered proliferation risks, such as peaceful nuclearexplosions and export of commercial enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Ever sinceits creation in 1977, DOE has been committed to advancing U.S. proliferation-relatedobjectives. Over time, several programs have emerged in DOE that bear on thoseobjectives. The most important relate to nuclear matters in the former Soviet Union. Theseinclude developing Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) systems,disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials (notably the purchase of highly enricheduranium from Russia), participating in the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort, helping toconvert Russia’s three plutonium production reactors to fuel that will not produce weaponsgradeplutonium, and the Nuclear Cities Initiative.DOE’s strength is also its weakness. The Department and its laboratories are excellent atcreating new high-performance technology, although the cost to develop such technologyis high, and the laboratories do not have experience in procuring and deploying systems inthe commercial world. The expertise of the laboratory system is unparalleled in the nuclear62