Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

important weapon in BXA’s arsenal. Prohibiting a company from engaging in or benefitingfrom any U.S. export transaction is a penalty too high for many companies. In fiscal year1998, 29 individuals and companies were denied export privileges.Because Export Enforcement can interface with Export Administration regarding exportlicense applications, EE is able to detect, prevent and interdict illegal exports of WMDrelatedgoods and technology. EA’s export licensing database is also a source ofinformation about potential illicit transactions. All OEE personnel have the ability to review,and make a recommendation on, any application for export license. Special agents canflag companies who produce targeted technologies, parties who are under investigation,or parties who have been identified either by the IC or through investigation as frontcompanies for entities of concern. Once notified an application has been filed, specialagents can request a pre-license check be conducted to determine the bona fides of thepurchaser. If the legitimacy of the transaction cannot be established, OEE special agentscan recommend rejection of the application. In fiscal year 1998, OEE reviewed 5,500applications for export licenses, conducted 275 pre-license checks and recommendedrejection or return without action of 164 applications, thirty of which were based onunfavorable pre-license checks.OEE also requests and performs post-shipment verifications for commodities exportedfrom the U.S. to verify the goods were received by the declared end-user and are beingused in accordance with the conditions of the license. As part of OEE’s safeguardsprogram, pairs of special agents visited various countries identified as being of concernbecause they are either countries of proliferation concern or potential diversion locations.The special agents conduct in-person site visits in those countries to inspect commoditiesreceived from the U.S. During 12 visits to 21 countries in fiscal year 1998, OEE conducted289 post-shipment verifications. An additional 111 post-shipment verifications wereperformed by personnel at American embassies at the request of OEE or other units withinBXA. Six post-shipment verifications resulted in information that required furtherenforcement action.The NDAA of 1998 mandated that BXA conduct post-shipment verification of all highperformancecomputers exported to Tier 3 destinations. OEE established a five-personunit to coordinate and supervise all enforcement responsibilities under the NDAA,including receiving the post-shipment reporting for these exports. Due to the large numberof required high-performance computer post-shipment verifications, OEE has had todevote significant resources to conduct those checks. Four of the twelve ExportEnforcement safeguards visits were devoted primarily to NDAA-mandated post-shipmentverifications of high performance computers. Thus fewer resources and less flexibility areavailable to conduct post-shipment verifications on commodities and technologies thatmight have a more direct impact on proliferation projects.85