Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

While there has been considerable progress in U.S. intelligence capability, much remainsto be done to meet policy needs. There are no better reminders of the need forimprovement than the unexpected Indian nuclear test in May 1998 and North Korea’s testof a three-stage ballistic missile in August 1998. Similarly, the importance of intelligencefor warning about potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction was reinforced bythe revelation that environmental samples and other intelligence indicated that Usama BinLadin’s terrorist organization was interested in acquiring chemical weapons and had linksto the presence of a VX nerve agent precursor in Sudan. And surely our leaders deservea detailed appraisal of how well Russia is controlling its nuclear stockpile, its inventory ofstrategic nuclear and other WMD-related materials, its technology, and the technicalpersonnel who work, or have worked, on its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.Our objectives for proliferation-related intelligence should include the following:• The earliest possible warning of imminent and emerging WMD threats, including use,significant testing milestones, and technological surprises;• Accurate information and assessments about the WMD programs and operationalpractices of nations and sub-national groups, including associated delivery systemsand related technology, along with identification of vulnerabilities;• Greater understanding of the particular strategic, regional, and internal factors thatmotivate a country or sub-national group to acquire, or use, WMD capabilities, as wellas key points of leverage for influencing such decisions;• Identification of critical links and nodes in the web of selling, buying, and brokeringWMD technology and materials, as well as vulnerabilities in those procurementnetworks; and• Resource allocation in the IC should reflect the high priority accorded to combatingproliferation.Considerable collection and analytic resources are required to accomplish theseobjectives. Both collection and analysis must be better planned, managed, and organized,along both functional lines that stress the weapons and their means of delivery and alongregional lines, so that the political and security contexts that lead to demand for theseweapons are better understood.It is also important to address the relationship between intelligence and its customers, inboth Congress and the executive branch, and the ways in which this relationship can affectthe quality of the intelligence. Good intelligence is fundamental to combating proliferation.Most efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are shrouded in secrecy, deception,and denial; the Intelligence Community must pierce that shroud. In only the rarest cases—as in Iraq immediately after the Gulf War—can we quickly uncover vast quantities of67