Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Proper Role of Export Controls in Combating ProliferationAn effective export control system requires a national consensus on its importance andobjectives. What technologies are we trying to deny to a potential proliferator? Why? Forhow long?Protecting U.S. national interests requires (1) a clear policy backed by (2) a strongconsensus on the proper role of export controls in the context of both the growingavailability of proliferation-related technology and today’s difficult diplomatic environment.The United States now lacks both. The lack of a clear policy reflects an absence ofconsensus both within and between Congress and the Administration on the role of exportcontrols. Indeed, this issue has become more polarized in the past two years. TheCongress has reversed executive branch decisions in such areas as computer exports andthe process for reviewing commercial communications satellite license applications. Therange of views is broad, from those who favor unilateral controls to those who are onlyprepared to support export controls with broad multilateral support.The Commission believes that the recommendations outlined below can increase theeffectiveness of export controls in combating proliferation:Recommendation 4.1: Target U.S. export controls and enforcement efforts onend-users of concern.For export controls to keep proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and technology outof the wrong hands, assessments of the likely end user should be critical to decisions ofwhether to approve or deny an export license. This is increasingly true, as shown by ourexperience in Iraq. Proliferators will revert to using “low” technology when they are deniedaccess to high technology and their WMD aspirations require only a “low-tech” solution.Moreover, many dual-use items have such broad civilian applications that unless thecontrol system is sufficiently focused on end-users of real proliferation concern, U.S.controls could needlessly constrain many innocent exports while failing to denyproliferators the capacity to develop or produce weapons of mass destruction. As moreand more items fall into the “dual-use” area, it will be increasingly important to target U.S.controls on end-users that present a credible risk of diversion to a proliferation-relatedend-use.Automation can help meet this objective. For example, if the Shipper’s Export Declarationsalready required by law were collected electronically, they would provide a wealth of datathat would include vital information both for assessing proliferators’ procurement patternsand for determining when a proposed export should be denied. Mandating exporterparticipation in the Automated Export System would also save the expense of manually38