Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Export Enforcement is comprised of three offices: The Office of Export Enforcement, theOffice of Enforcement Analysis, and the Office of Antiboycott Compliance. The Office ofAntiboycott Compliance has no duties related to combating proliferation. ExportEnforcement has about 150 employees who have direct responsibility for non-proliferationactivities; 107 are special agents with full police powers whose sole responsibility is theenforcement of the Export Administration Regulations. The Office of Enforcement Analysisis located in headquarters. The Office of Export Enforcement headquarters includes theIntelligence and Field Support Division. This division is comprised of special agents andanalysts and interfaces on a daily basis with EA and with other government agencies,including the Intelligence Community. One special agent from OEE headquarters isdetailed to the NPC. The Office of Export Enforcement has eight field offices staffed byspecial agents and located near major ports and technology centers.Office of Export EnforcementThere has been a change in the nature and direction of EE’s work over the past ten yearswith the end of CoCom, the deregulation of many dual-use items and the globalization oftrade. Within the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), non-proliferation efforts are carriedout on a regular basis. The Office of Export Enforcement has developed proliferationrelatedcases by focusing on end users and end uses of items subject to the EAA and theEAR.OEE’s efforts are primarily focused on investigating and interdicting illegal transactions, aswell as prosecutions for violations. OEE’s special agents receive information aboutpotential or past violations from a variety of sources, including the intelligence community,other law enforcement agencies and to a significant degree, the exporting community.OEE’s special agents have full police powers granted by the Export Administration Act;upon expiration of the Act however, OEE special agents have had to be deputized by theU.S. Marshal's Service in order to continue their law enforcement powers. OEE's specialagents conduct and participate in criminal investigations using all investigative resources,including undercover operations, detention and seizure of illicit exports, execution ofsearch warrants, arrest, and criminal prosecution. In fiscal year 1998, OEE had 40detentions, executed 11 search warrants, arrested 5 individuals, indicted 7 individuals and5 companies, and convicted 13 individuals and 4 companies. So far in fiscal year 1999,OEE has executed 8 search warrants and arrested 7. Criminal penalties totaled$11,473,00 in fiscal year 1998. While many investigations are successfully concluded byOEE alone, some investigations are worked jointly with the U.S. Customs Service whichshares jurisdiction of the EAA with OEE. Some investigations are joint cases with the FBIwhen transactions fall under the jurisdictions of both the FBI and OEE.OEE special agents also investigate and refer for administrative sanctions violations of theEAR which do not meet the level of a criminal prosecution. In fiscal year 1998, Commercelevied $2,549,000 in administrative penalties. Denial of export privileges is a very84
important weapon in BXA’s arsenal. Prohibiting a company from engaging in or benefitingfrom any U.S. export transaction is a penalty too high for many companies. In fiscal year1998, 29 individuals and companies were denied export privileges.Because Export Enforcement can interface with Export Administration regarding exportlicense applications, EE is able to detect, prevent and interdict illegal exports of WMDrelatedgoods and technology. EA’s export licensing database is also a source ofinformation about potential illicit transactions. All OEE personnel have the ability to review,and make a recommendation on, any application for export license. Special agents canflag companies who produce targeted technologies, parties who are under investigation,or parties who have been identified either by the IC or through investigation as frontcompanies for entities of concern. Once notified an application has been filed, specialagents can request a pre-license check be conducted to determine the bona fides of thepurchaser. If the legitimacy of the transaction cannot be established, OEE special agentscan recommend rejection of the application. In fiscal year 1998, OEE reviewed 5,500applications for export licenses, conducted 275 pre-license checks and recommendedrejection or return without action of 164 applications, thirty of which were based onunfavorable pre-license checks.OEE also requests and performs post-shipment verifications for commodities exportedfrom the U.S. to verify the goods were received by the declared end-user and are beingused in accordance with the conditions of the license. As part of OEE’s safeguardsprogram, pairs of special agents visited various countries identified as being of concernbecause they are either countries of proliferation concern or potential diversion locations.The special agents conduct in-person site visits in those countries to inspect commoditiesreceived from the U.S. During 12 visits to 21 countries in fiscal year 1998, OEE conducted289 post-shipment verifications. An additional 111 post-shipment verifications wereperformed by personnel at American embassies at the request of OEE or other units withinBXA. Six post-shipment verifications resulted in information that required furtherenforcement action.The NDAA of 1998 mandated that BXA conduct post-shipment verification of all highperformancecomputers exported to Tier 3 destinations. OEE established a five-personunit to coordinate and supervise all enforcement responsibilities under the NDAA,including receiving the post-shipment reporting for these exports. Due to the large numberof required high-performance computer post-shipment verifications, OEE has had todevote significant resources to conduct those checks. Four of the twelve ExportEnforcement safeguards visits were devoted primarily to NDAA-mandated post-shipmentverifications of high performance computers. Thus fewer resources and less flexibility areavailable to conduct post-shipment verifications on commodities and technologies thatmight have a more direct impact on proliferation projects.85
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CombatingProliferation ofWeapons of
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ContentsExecutive Summary vIntroduc
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Executive SummaryEvery American sho
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Similarly, the Commission assessed
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ole as a supplier of ballistic miss
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economic, political, and diplomatic
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Sixth, we must prepare for the thre
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82A (45p x 55p)
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An improved mechanism for White Hou
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esolved before the meetings occur.
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In advising the President and ViceP
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Recommendation 2.3: The President s
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Chapter 3Managing the Interagency P
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the CPC will need to set program re
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Agency Budget ProcessesRecommendati
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The Persian Gulf War gave vivid war
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One example of poor coordination is
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The lengthy time required for techn
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• facilitating other countries’
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efficiently among the departments,
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organizations about proliferation t
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The Proper Role of Export Controls
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Second, many of the countries that
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function is shared as a statutory r
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coherent and effective non-prolifer
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and training opportunities that wil
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The Commission believes this reorga
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Responding to Proliferation that Ha
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Recommendation 5.4: The National Di
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545B (45p x 28p)
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• Second, DoD elements are still
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(3) Maintain the regional responsib
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5C (45p x 33p)61
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and related areas (such as instrume
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Recommendation 5.10: DOE’s prolif
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While there has been considerable p
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Recommendation 5.13: The President
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Recommendation 5.16: The Director o
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own export control system. This eff
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For a variety of reasons, however,
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In theory, all goods leaving or ent
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Committee on Foreign Investment in
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context. The results of this assess
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when grand jury secrecy no longer a
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The FBI’s National Security Divis
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Commission notes that the FBI has i
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Departments of Health and Human Ser
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Department of AgricultureThe Depart
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As discussed in Chapter 3, collabor
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SEC. 711. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSI
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(C) existing arrangements governing
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serve without compensation in addit
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(a) Extension of Deadline for Submi
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on the Senate Budget and Commerce,
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106
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Richard K. BettsCouncil on Foreign
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William CohenSecretary of DefenseCo
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EWilliam EckertDepartment of StateR
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Thomas GrahamSecond Choice Foundati
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Robert JosephDirector for Counterpr
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Jacob L. LewDirectorOffice of Manag
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Michael MoodiePresidentChemical and
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Paul RobinsonPresident and Laborato
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Owen J. SheaksSpecial AdvisorVerifi
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Bonni G. TischlerAssistant Commissi
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Gillian WoollettAssociate VP for Bi
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7. List and describe the authoritie
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17. What deficiencies and strengths
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Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordina
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Groups Addressing WMD Accident, Eme
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IAEA Steering CommitteeChair: State
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Title (Legislation that Contains Re
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Appendix G: Resource Allocation—B
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Department of State• NDF• NIS e
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Department of Agriculture• Select
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AbbreviationsAGARSCBRNCDCCFIUSCPDCT
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Appendix H: Technology AcquisitionA
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to change; up-to-date data should b
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this activity: the Materials Protec
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National Goal: Military Action (Inc
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• PE 602715BR: Hard Target Defeat
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• Active defensesTechnology Progr
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that provides an order-of-magnitude
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Additional ViewsAdditional Views of
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The following is a brief outline of
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Additional Views of Margo D. B. Car
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Annex:Organizational OverviewsExecu
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policies through a briefing schedul
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The current Senior Director, as wit
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Although responsibility for prolife
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• the Under Secretary of Defense
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Treaty negotiations, U.S. nuclear p
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• integrated national policies fo
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President with the Prime Minister o
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A small secretariat guides the day-
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U.S.-Russia Proliferation Issues in
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and procedures; assessing competing
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Senate, and who is also dual-hatted
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Department of StateThe Non-prolifer
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(CTBT). The Verification and Compli
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The Science Centers are established
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Enhancing Export Controls 3Demilita
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Page 221 and 222: UkraineThis assistance is to preven
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Page 231 and 232: The office of the Assistant Secreta
Page 233 and 234: Directive 5134.9, and is responsibl
Page 235 and 236: • The Counter-proliferation Progr
Page 237 and 238: 4 Mitigate the Effects of WMD Use5
Page 239 and 240: U.S. Army Top Ranked Specific Milit
Page 241 and 242: • The Director, Defense Research
Page 243 and 244: Technology—has primary oversight
Page 245 and 246: • Recommendation 1 to reinforce t
Page 247 and 248: AEC’s successor agencies, the Dep
Page 249 and 250: Components of NN-40 include the Int
Page 251 and 252: ensure excess fissile material no l
Page 253 and 254: X07, 18x24• participate with the
Page 255 and 256: Nuclear Regulatory CommissionBackgr
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Page 259 and 260: The Intelligence CommunityThe Intel
Page 261 and 262: The DCI Nonproliferation Center, un
Page 263 and 264: Findings of the Aspin-Brown and Jer
Page 265 and 266: Department of CommerceThe Bureau of
Page 267 and 268: Office of Exporter Services. In add
Page 269: The OC weighs the intelligence info
Page 273 and 274: Non-proliferation and Export Contro
Page 275 and 276: The Customs Service’s response to
Page 277 and 278: An additional benefit to the Bureau
Page 279: The Exon-Florio provision does not
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Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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