Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Even our basic understanding of the threat, as contained in models of WMD lethalityand vulnerability, has major gaps and unsolved problems.The Department of Defense predicts that, given current technology programs andresources, only incremental improvements to these deficiencies will be made in the next1-3 years.To be sure, acquiring modern technology is not easy. It involves an entire cycle of research,development, and acquisition activities, including testing, deploying, and supportingtechnologies put into the field. Furthermore, it is an expensive process that placespressure on our limited federal budgets. It requires building and maintaining a highly skilledworkforce with the best facilities and equipment. It requires vision, long term strategies,expert management, and careful oversight.But while the rewards for successful technology acquisition are great, so too are theconsequences of failure. We cannot afford to duplicate acquisition efforts wastefully withinthe federal enterprise. We cannot afford to develop technologies that will never be fielded.We cannot leave unused technology capabilities already available from the private sector.We cannot wait decades for technology support. Yet we are doing all of the above.Problems with Current PracticeWMD technology acquisition efforts in the Federal Government today occur in severaldepartments and agencies and are not well integrated. The Department of Defense (DoD),the Department of Energy, and the Intelligence Community each separately reports itsWMD-related technology acquisition efforts under the 1994 National DefenseAuthorization Act. Of these technology producers, DoD is by far the largest, with thegreatest budget investment, facilities, and expertise for combating WMD.Other agencies, such as the departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture,also fund technology programs of direct importance to the WMD mission. However, theseorganizations have not traditionally classified their activity as being “WMD-related,” nor dothey formally report or coordinate their efforts with the Intelligence Community or thedepartments of Defense and Energy.Despite the existence of numerous “coordination mechanisms” (such as those describedin the DoD section of Chapter 5), the Commission finds that existing efforts to coordinatethe diverse WMD technology acquisition efforts fall far short of the minimum standardarticulated above, and result in poor integration and substantially reduced effectiveness forthe entire federal technology investment used for combating WMD.Examples abound of poor coordination, redundancy, and neglect of private sectortechnology.26