Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Recommendation 1 to reinforce the national commitment and fortify thesense of mission: “The Administration and Congress, through actions andwords, could make a concerted and continuing effort to convey to thenuclear weapons community that their mission is vital to the security of thenation and will remain vital well beyond the planning horizons normallyassociated with programmatic decisions. This message should beunequivocal, clear, and periodically reinforced”;• Recommendation 3 on Strengthening the Department of Energy (DOE)-Department of Defense (Department of Defense) Relationship: “Create atrue partnership that forges both a shared commitment to meet nationalsecurity needs for nuclear weapons”;• Recommendation 7 on establishing and implementing plans on a prioritybasis for replenishing essential technical workforce needs in critical skills:“Large numbers of the nuclear weapons workforce are reaching retirementand a new generation of essential scientific, engineering and technicalworkers must be hired and trained in order to preserve essential skills”;• Recommendation 9 on expanding training and career planning programswhich are adapted to the dramatically changed workforce environment;• Recommendation 10 on expanding the use of former nuclear weaponsprogram employees: “Institute a small, select Nuclear Weapons WorkersReserve from those with key skills to maintain the ability to increaseexperienced staff rapidly, when and if required”;• Recommendation 11 on creating a permanent Defense Programs AdvisoryCommittee: “formed of senior, experienced personnel capable of assessingstockpile integration and priorities.”; and• Recommendation 12 on enhancing congressional oversight: “Providepositive explicit reinforcement of the public service character of the missionto maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.”In sum, the lack of a single focus for weapons of mass destruction with sufficient seniorityand necessary resources has resulted in “pockets” of programs within the Department ofDefense (like the chemical and biological defense program) that tend to operateindependently of each other and cannot be traced to a single integrated Department-wideprogram plan. There is an urgent need for a single policy and a single acquisition authorityfor programs to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction within theDepartment of Defense59