11.07.2015 Views

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

For a variety <strong>of</strong> reasons, however, there is not adequate sharing <strong>of</strong> information betweenenforcement agents and the Intelligence Community. Moreover, agents are limited in theirability to tap into information outside BXA on end-users. Because <strong>of</strong> BXA’s visibility in theexporting community and the outreach efforts <strong>of</strong> the agents, many exporters call OEE firstwhen they are concerned about an end-user. BXA <strong>of</strong>ficials can query only the Bureau’sown database in response to these calls, and there is no way for them to query other USGovernment sources <strong>of</strong> information about end-users, classified and unclassified. It isessential that BXA be fully integrated into the information-sharing process in order to takeswift action to prevent illegal export.Recommendation 5.21: The National Director for <strong>Combating</strong> <strong>Proliferation</strong> shouldwork with the Under Secretary <strong>of</strong> Commerce for Export Administration to improveinformation sharing between the Bureau <strong>of</strong> Export Administration and theIntelligence Community, and should develop mechanisms by which special agentsin the field can request and receive end-user information from US Governmentsources.Specifically, BXA should be connected to the IC network in order to facilitate queryingclassified sources regarding end-users.Training <strong>of</strong> PersonnelExport license application processing requires the assessment <strong>of</strong> the potential proliferationand strategic uses <strong>of</strong> an item, vetting the end-user through the Intelligence Community,and consulting with other agencies who review these applications, including theDepartments <strong>of</strong> State, Defense, and Energy, and the Nonproliferation Center. The initialanalysis <strong>of</strong> an export license application is done by BXA’s licensing <strong>of</strong>ficers. Theselicensing <strong>of</strong>ficers need technical expertise in the technologies for which they review licenseapplications. These <strong>of</strong>ficers are not the sole source <strong>of</strong> expertise, as some technicalanalysis is contributed from other agencies during the interagency review process.Recommendation 5.22: The Bureau <strong>of</strong> Export Administration should take steps toincrease the expertise <strong>of</strong> its licensing <strong>of</strong>ficers.The ideal solution would be to recruit specialists in the technologies <strong>of</strong> WMD. Where thisis not possible, training <strong>of</strong> existing personnel should be a priority, and BXA should takeadvantage <strong>of</strong> the expertise among the various agencies, including the IC, to providetraining for licensing personnel.75

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!