global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESOld nuclear habits and strategies die hard, however. The currentnuclear modernization programs in both Russia and theUnited States are essentially replicating the old legacy postureswith newer hardware. Unable to shake loose from theentrenched model, both cling to the Triad construct and tovulnerable silo-based missiles.Further clouding the nuclear horizon is the prospect that othernuclear weapons countries will copy the old U.S.-Russiamodel. This will introduce all the liabilities mentioned above.In particular, it will increase pressure to raise the level of theirnuclear attack readiness, and shorten their warning and decisiontimes. This emulation appears to be underway as a naturalprogression of maturing nuclear force operations, stimulatedfurther by tit-for-tat increases in the attack readinessof opposing forces. With as many as eight or nine countriesheading in this direction, and more proliferators in the wings,the risks will multiply of accidental, unauthorized, inadvertentand irrational launch under short and pressure-packeddecision timelines.It is not too late to slow or halt this trend. On the contrary, atthe current stage of their development, the nuclear posturesof the majority of the nuclear weapons countries includingChina, India, Pakistan, France and the United Kingdom are“models” compared to the Russian and U.S. postures. Theirarchitectures have provided for lower alert rates and affordeddecision-makers more time to consider their nuclear options.The United States and Russia could learn from these models.In the absence of a fundamental makeover of the U.S. andRussian nuclear policies and postures, it is still possible toremodel their nuclear postures on the margins to reduce nuclearrisk. Central to this approach is to help create an internationalnorm that pressures nations to operate their nuclearforces at a low level of attack readiness. This norm should beembodied in physical, organizational, and operational constraints–“de-alerting” measures – that eliminate the ability tofire nuclear forces quickly and conversely require lengthy visiblepreparations to get them ready for launch. Imposing suchmeasures on nuclear postures originally designed for highalert status and prompt launch is a suboptimal remedy for theills that concern us. But de-alerting is certainly feasible and itcan be effective in increasing warning and decision time andfoiling the exploitation of nuclear command and control byunauthorized actors and hackers. Even a set of ad hoc “quickfixes” can offer an efficacious solution to many dangers.De-alerting should be codified by a politically or legally bindingagreement among the nuclear weapons countries thatincludes provisions for verification. Essentially, this reportdevelops a de-alerting framework which has two pillars: (i)an early, priority agreement between Russia and the UnitedStates that seeks to get them both off their current launchreadyposture and in particular eliminate from both sides theirleanings toward launch on warning, and (ii) a longer-termagreement that can be implemented <strong>global</strong>ly with all nuclearweapons countries. The report recommends other cooperativemeasures designed to reduce nuclear risks, reflecting abelief that joint efforts among nuclear weapons countries tofashion plans to reduce nuclear risk can produce modest andsometimes impressive success. Security cooperation is an underlyingtheme of the prescriptive agenda of this study.These efforts would affirm support for the Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT), which continues to be the bedrock of the internationalcommunity’s effort to prevent and roll back proliferation.The Article VI obligation to pursue good faith negotiationsfor nuclear disarmament may have been “essentiallyhortatory” at one time, but today it is and must be taken seriously.Through nuclear arms control, the United States, Russiaand other nuclear weapons powers show respect for thenuclear disarmament aspirations of the vast majority of thetreaty’s 189 signatories, and in return these powers can expectthem to stiffen their resolve in enforcing the NPT, supportingthe P5+1 talks with Iran, and in continuing to pursue NorthKorea to end its nuclear pursuits and return to compliancewith its NPT obligations (notwithstanding its proclaimedwithdrawal). The days of U.S. and Russian lax and introspectivecompliance with the disarmament clause of the treatyare over if we hope to preserve and strengthen the treaty inthe face of growing proliferation pressures around the world.And the more the nuclear weapons countries regulate and reducetheir nuclear stockpiles, the more vigilant the world willbecome in ferreting out and clamping down on clandestineprograms and other NPT violations. This collective resolve iscrucial to the security of all countries.4
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESII. OVERVIEWAn arc of latent nuclear instability stretches around theglobe. From Central Europe through South Asia to NortheastAsia and into the seas surrounding China, the nuclearweapons countries, or their close allies, are involved ingeopolitical, territorial and other disputes that have the potentialto combust and escalate. The arc indeed girdles theworld inasmuch as instability lies in the nature of bilateraland multilateral relationships and is affected by <strong>global</strong>problems of proliferation, terrorism, nuclear materials andweapons control, transparency and many others.Crisis management is more difficult in today’s security environmentthan it was in the bipolar world of the Cold War.Conflict dynamics are less stable. Under the right conditions,any of the hotspots along this arc could morph intoa nuclear flashpoint. A nuclear crisis could escalate throughinadvertence or intention and also spread virally to otherparts of the world. Many countries possess nuclear forces,and their postures are coupled, tightly in some cases andloosely in others. A nuclear confrontation or detonationwould raise nuclear tensions and alert levels around theworld. Such a multipolar nuclear crisis could follow an unpredictablecourse and prove difficult to stabilize.This report identifies ways to control crisis escalation andreduce the myriad risks of deliberate or unintentional use ofnuclear weapons. It is both diagnostic in that it examines therisk of nuclear weapons use in the various nuclear weaponscountries, as well as prescriptive in offering some remedies.Any balanced assessment of worldwide nuclear risk findscause both for encouragement and concern. One piece ofgood news is that the <strong>global</strong> stockpile of nuclear weapons hasplunged from a peak of 70,000 in the 1980s to approximately16,000 today. If nuclear risk and stockpile size are correlated,then dramatic progress has been achieved. But the overall declinemasks the gloomy fact that some arsenals are growingrapidly and posing greater risks, as in South Asia.This dichotomous pattern is pervasive. A few examples:Good news: Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materialsare substantially more secure against theft today than theywere when the Soviet Union collapsed over two decadesago. Bad news: (i) the world is home to sponsors of proliferation,nuclear black markets, and promoters of terrorism,(ii) large quantities of nuclear weapons are constantly intransit around the world – and transportation is the Achillesheel of security, and (iii) the risks of terrorist capture ofweapons and materials have increased in South Asia overthe past two decades. Pretty good news: the number of nationspossessing nuclear weapons has climbed slowly whilea greater number of aspiring proliferators have abandonedtheir programs. Bad news: the number of nations that possessor aspire to possess a peaceful nuclear energy programthat could be transformed into a nuclear weapons programis fast growing, and many of these potential proliferators arelacking in good governance. Good and bad news: non-kineticand conventional weapons (offensive and defensive) and<strong>global</strong> surveillance and intelligence have provided a crediblealternative to nuclear weapons for some nations, but theypose threats to other nations that lead them to increase theirreliance on nuclear weapons.While these overly simplified illustrations of risk correlationspresent a mixed picture, this <strong>commission</strong> finds an overallpattern: risks are generally trending in the wrong direction.The cup appears to be more than half empty in today’s securityenvironment of proliferation, nuclear build-ups in Asia,spreading extremism, burgeoning cyber warfare, vulnerablenuclear command and control networks, vulnerable and insecurenuclear weapons storage sites and delivery platforms(particularly silo-based strategic missiles), and de-stabilizing<strong>global</strong> military competition featuring rapid innovationin weapons technology and modalities of warfare. In thecurrent environment, much needs to be done to reduce nuclearrisks. The slope from a crisis to nuclear brinksmanshipto escalation to the use of nuclear weapons with cascading<strong>global</strong> implications is a much too steep and slippery one.This latent instability is tremendously aggravated by thesimple fact that the amount of time for decision-making atany point along this spectrum may be far too short. In general,warning and decision timelines are getting shorter, andconsequently the potential for fateful human error in nuclearcontrol systems is getting larger.5
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