global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYAn arc of potential nuclear instability stretches around theglobe. From Central Europe through South Asia to NortheastAsia and into the seas surrounding China, the nuclear weaponscountries, or their close allies, are involved in geopolitical,territorial and other disputes that have the potential to eruptand escalate. Under the right conditions, any of the hotspotsalong this arc could expand by design or inadvertence into anuclear crisis.This report identifies ways to control crisis escalation and reducethe myriad risks of the deliberate or unintentional use ofnuclear weapons. It is both diagnostic in that it examines therisk of nuclear weapons use, as well as prescriptive in offeringsome remedies. It discerns an overall pattern in which risksare generally trending in the wrong direction in today’s securityenvironment of proliferation, nuclear build-ups in Asia,spreading extremism, burgeoning cyber warfare, exploitablenuclear command and control networks, vulnerable and insecurenuclear weapons storage sites and delivery platforms(particularly silo-based strategic missiles), and de-stabilizing<strong>global</strong> military competition featuring rapid innovation inweapons technology and modalities of warfare. In the currentenvironment, much needs to be done to reduce nuclear risks.The slope from a crisis to nuclear brinksmanship to escalationto the use of nuclear weapons with cascading <strong>global</strong> implicationsis a much too steep and slippery one.This latent instability is tremendously aggravated by the simplefact that the amount of time for decision-making at anypoint along this spectrum may be far too short. In general,warning and decision timelines are getting shorter, and consequentlythe potential for fateful human error in nuclearcontrol systems is growing larger.The short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces compoundthe risks. One-half of their strategic arsenals are continuouslymaintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carryingnearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice.These legacy postures of the Cold War are anachronisms butthey remain fully operational.Throughout the nuclear age the development, deploymentand operation of nuclear weapons purportedly adopted aset of “best practices” – policy prescriptions designed tostrengthen strategic stability, and a set of standards designedto minimize the risks of their accidental, unauthorized, andinadvertent use, or theft.Foremost among the policy aims was survivability. Survivableforces and command, control, and communications werenecessary to project credible threats of second-strike retaliation,considered the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. Besidesunderwriting deterrence, survivability would relieve the pressureto “use or lose” nuclear forces, thus extending the timeavailable for deliberation and increasing the latitude for respondingflexibly.Second, sound nuclear policy dictated that national leadersmaintain firm and exclusive control over nuclear weapons atall times to ensure that nuclear operations always carried outtheir orders and intentions, and never carried out actions thatwere not intended. This policy aim demanded resilient commandand control capable of flexibly directing nuclear forcesto coherent national purpose in all peacetime and conflictconditions. It also demanded high safety standards to preventaccidental detonations and strict safeguards to prevent unauthorizeduse.And third, the decision-making process had to be rational,which not only required leaders who were mentally “stable”but also robust information networks to support their deliberations.Rational decision-making required timely, accurateinformation about any situation in order to avoid ill-consideredand misguided choices, particularly a decision to launchnuclear missiles on the basis of false information.In reality, the major nuclear antagonists – the United Statesand Russia – fell short of meeting these standards. The nucleararms race produced tens of thousands of weapons on eachside and rendered command and communications, and largeportions of the nuclear arsenals, vulnerable to attack. Bothsides feared that a “decapitating” strike could prevent themfrom striking back after absorbing an attack. In an attempt toavoid decapitation, both undertook some of the riskiest projectsof the Cold War. All U.S. presidents extensively pre-del-1