global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESc<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al hegem<strong>on</strong>y in the regi<strong>on</strong>. Therefore the role ofChina’s <strong>nuclear</strong> forces in its nati<strong>on</strong>al security strategy shouldactually shrink over time and, if so, China will have less reas<strong>on</strong>to resist de-alerting obligati<strong>on</strong>s growing out of a multilateralnegotiati<strong>on</strong>. It would make good sense for China tomaintain its de-alerted status quo for its own forces whilewelcoming comparable obligati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> the part of other <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s countries at the same time that China movesinto c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al military balance in the regi<strong>on</strong> and gainsnati<strong>on</strong>al power <strong>on</strong> par with the United States. 81C. UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCEThe United Kingdom should be amenable to a <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g>de-alerting agreement because it would substantially solvea security c<strong>on</strong>undrum that has perplexed and disorientedU.K. decisi<strong>on</strong>-making <strong>on</strong> the future of its strategic <strong>nuclear</strong>submarine force. France is basically in the same boat andwould benefit equally from <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> de-alerting.No other <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s country has professed a str<strong>on</strong>gercommitment than the United Kingdom to reducing the roleof <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s in its nati<strong>on</strong>al security strategy. Puttingthis commitment to the test, the United Kingdom is c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>tingan imminent decisi<strong>on</strong> between unilaterally disarming,investing upwards of 40 billi<strong>on</strong> dollars to replace itsaging fleet of ballistic missile submarines and their missiles,or building a different and less expensive <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>ssystem. (A final decisi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> building a new submarine fleetis needed in 2016 so that new submarines could enter servicein the 2020-25 timeframe.)81 Chinese <strong>nuclear</strong> history further suggests a potential willingness toenter into a multilateral process to regulate <strong>nuclear</strong> arms <strong>on</strong> a <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g>basis. In 1964, the year of its first atomic test, China advocated total<str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament. In 1982, then Foreign Minister Huang Huapledged that China would be ready to join the process if Russia and theUnited States cut their weap<strong>on</strong>s by 50 percent, ceased testing them, andstopped producing them. At that time there were 57,000 weap<strong>on</strong>s inthe combined U.S.-Russian arsenals. Today there are 16,000, a cut of 70percent. The two Cold War rivals also have maintained a moratorium <strong>on</strong><strong>nuclear</strong> testing and <strong>on</strong> fissile materials producti<strong>on</strong> for two decades. Thisdownsizing clearly meets Huang Hua’s criteria for China entering into anew multilateral process of arms regulati<strong>on</strong>.Having l<strong>on</strong>g ago retired all tactical weap<strong>on</strong>s and relinquishedall sec<strong>on</strong>dary roles and missi<strong>on</strong>s (in the “war-fighting”category) for its <strong>nuclear</strong> forces, the United Kingdom’s<strong>nuclear</strong> policy and posture have been stripped down to bareessentials. The employment of U.K. <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s is reservedfor extreme situati<strong>on</strong>s that threaten its very survival– notably, a direct <strong>nuclear</strong> threat to the U.K. homeland. Suchimprobable threats can be partially countered by high-precisi<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al weap<strong>on</strong>s in NATO-allied operati<strong>on</strong>s, andmissile defenses. The United Kingdom enjoys the luxury ofbel<strong>on</strong>ging to a powerful alliance system that can defend thenati<strong>on</strong> against practically any plausible current threat it faceswithout needing to resort to <strong>nuclear</strong> force. However, theU.K. c<strong>on</strong>sensus appears to see a c<strong>on</strong>tinuing need for <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s to deter <strong>nuclear</strong> blackmail or cold-blooded <strong>nuclear</strong>attack, and appears to endorse maintaining a strategic submarinefleet to satisfy this need. The country is not preparedto disarm unilaterally in the face of residual <strong>nuclear</strong> threat,however remote and declining it has become.The <strong>nuclear</strong> c<strong>on</strong>undrum facing the United Kingdom stemsfrom the fact that while it str<strong>on</strong>gly desires to further shrinkthe size of its four-boat submarine fleet, in part for budgetaryreas<strong>on</strong>s, it has no margin to eliminate even a single submarinewithout losing the capability to maintain c<strong>on</strong>tinuoussea patrols. Its fleet has reached a point of near indivisibility– an irreducible minimum – that does not lend itself tofurther cuts unless the it adopts a practice of disc<strong>on</strong>tinuousalert patrols. This would mean that a three-boat fleet wouldbe anchored in port much of the time, where it would bevulnerable to a sudden <strong>nuclear</strong> (and possibly c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al)strike. This noti<strong>on</strong> of unilateral de-alerting – maintaining a<strong>nuclear</strong> “deterrent” force that is not survivable much of thetime and that in fact seems to invite an attack – rouses scantsupport, although the United Kingdom has flirted with theidea of coordinating alert sea patrol schedules with Francein order to ensure that, jointly, they could keep either a U.K.or French submarine at sea at all times.If the United Kingdom chose to aband<strong>on</strong> submarines altogether,it does still have the technical capacity to develop anddeploy <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s delivered by sea- or air-launched45