global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES• Intrusi<strong>on</strong> detectors and physical barriers;• Separati<strong>on</strong> of warhead cores from their det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>comp<strong>on</strong>ents;• Storage of comp<strong>on</strong>ents in protected underground sites;• Instituti<strong>on</strong> of PAL-like authenticating code systems;• Internal security undertaken by a large security forcevetted through a system akin to the U.S. Pers<strong>on</strong>nel ReliabilityProgram;• “Cradle-to-grave oversight” applying to all engineering,scientific, and military pers<strong>on</strong>nel;• Two-pers<strong>on</strong> rule within the army in which no acti<strong>on</strong> involvinga <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong> can be undertaken by fewerthan two people (firing may require three people); and• Dummy missiles to complicate adversarial military calculati<strong>on</strong>s.According to a 2009 <strong>report</strong>, Pakistan locates much of its <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s infrastructure to the north and west of thecountry and many of the sites are close to or within Talibanand al Qaida dominated areas. 29 However, no <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s are stored in the area of Taliban activity, and theSPD has a 25,000-pers<strong>on</strong> security force and specially trainedrapid-reacti<strong>on</strong> forces to strengthen <strong>nuclear</strong> security. Viewsdiffer <strong>on</strong> the questi<strong>on</strong> of jihadist influence within the Pakistaniarmy and the possible subversi<strong>on</strong> of the <strong>nuclear</strong> establishment.30 However, the army today seeks to dissociate29 Ibid.30 Zia Mian and Pervez Hoodhboy argue that religi<strong>on</strong> has divided intotwo armies: <strong>on</strong>e is a nati<strong>on</strong>al army that sees Islam as part of Pakistanicultural identity, the other believes it is God’s army and that the stateand Islam are inseparable. The authors believe that this divisi<strong>on</strong> mayhave even trickled down to the Strategic Plans Divisi<strong>on</strong> (see PervezHoodbhoy and Zia Mian, “Pakistan, the Army and the C<strong>on</strong>flict Within,”Middle East Research and Informati<strong>on</strong> Project, July 12, 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071211.) Shuja Nawaz argues that Pakistan’smilitary realizes the need to provide security for the populace, but isill-equipped to deal with the already difficult-to-police militants. Thearmy is unprepared for war with India and unprepared to meet thechallenges posed by internal insurgencies. He believes the army needs tobe transformed from a “lumbering giant” to a “leaner and highly mobileforce” in order to provide security to Pakistanis and isolate insurgents.(Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan It’s Army and the Wars Within,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.) Christine Fair argues that thebehavior of Pakistan’s army is based <strong>on</strong> a fear of Indian hegem<strong>on</strong>y in theregi<strong>on</strong>. Pakistan’s army has worked to limit Indian and Russian influencein Afghanistan, supported terrorism against India, and sought alliancesitself from terrorists.Pakistan retains a first-use opti<strong>on</strong> as a counterweight to India’ssuperior c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces, but officials have statedthat <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s will be used <strong>on</strong>ly as a last resort. Asearlier noted, India’s Cold Start doctrine instigated Pakistaniplans to develop and deploy tactical <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>sfor limited use <strong>on</strong> the battlefield. These weap<strong>on</strong>s – primarilyshort range missiles – and their infrastructure would needto be forward deployed in peacetime in order to be effective.Pakistan, however, has yet to move battlefield weap<strong>on</strong>s intoforward positi<strong>on</strong>s and <strong>report</strong>s <strong>on</strong> the Pakistani <strong>nuclear</strong> arsenalc<strong>on</strong>tinue to describe it as stored and de-mated.Other key elements of Pakistan’s <strong>nuclear</strong> war plans wererevealed by the remarks of the SPD’s head, General KhalidKidwai, to private researchers (Pakistani officials later calledGeneral Kidwai’s remarks neither an official statement nor aprecise summary of <strong>nuclear</strong> use policy):“Nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s are aimed solely at India.In case that deterrence fails, they will beused if India attacks Pakistan and c<strong>on</strong>quersa large part of its territory; India destroysa large part either of its land or air forces;India proceeds to the ec<strong>on</strong>omic strangling ofPakistan (i.e., naval blockade and stoppingof the waters of the Indus River); or Indiapushes Pakistan into political destabilizati<strong>on</strong>or creates a large scale internal subversi<strong>on</strong> inPakistan.” 31Who decides when to cross the <strong>nuclear</strong> Rubic<strong>on</strong>? A troikawith the United States. and China am<strong>on</strong>g others strictly as a result of thisfear. Fair argues that this strategic climate in Pakistan will not changebecause of the prevalence of military culture based in the two-nati<strong>on</strong>theory and the ideology of Islam. [C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End:The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, May27, 2014).]31 Paulo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellin, “Nuclear safety, <strong>nuclear</strong>stability and <strong>nuclear</strong> strategy in Pakistan,” January 21, 2002, http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/c<strong>on</strong>tent/binary/pakistan%20Januray%202002.pdf.26