global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESThe U.S. nuclear posture must provide under all circumstances,especially during an intense and threatening crisisor imminent nuclear strike against North America, the timeand latitude for the President to consult, deliberate, and thendirect nuclear forces to coherent national purposes throughrobust command and communications networks. It must notbe geared for hair-trigger operations that relegate presidentialleadership and the actions of hundreds of subordinatesthroughout the chain of command to short checklists andsplit-second choices. Instead of pressing the President to makefateful decisions in minutes and seconds, the posture shouldafford the President and senior advisors days to consider thebest course of action.Nor should the U.S. posture exert such excessive time pressureon a nuclear-armed potential adversary such as Russia that itsdecision-making apparatus is compelled to react at lightingspeed. Thus the U.S. nuclear forces should not be constantlyprimed for launching a sudden strike on a scale that so threatensthe opposing side’s capacity for retaliation that it mustalways be prepared to launch its strategic missiles on warningduring the 15- to 30-minute flight time of incoming U.S.nuclear warheads. Projecting a constant draconian first-strikethreat is counter-productive inasmuch as it increases the riskthat the United States will be on the receiving end of an attacktriggered by false warning, misjudgment, panic or unauthorizedacts.The option to execute an immediate large-scale launch of U.S.strategic nuclear forces (launch-on-warning/launch-under-attack)during day-to-day operations will be eliminated in favorof time-sequenced procedures. The Defense Department willdevelop and recommend appropriate measures – such as “unsafing”missiles to restore launch circuits, loading target datainto missile computers, and mating warheads to missiles – thatdelay the generation and use of U.S. nuclear weapons by a matterof days. The U.S. (and Russian) posture should be modifiedto allow 24-72 hours in which to assess threats, deliberate, andexercise national direction over any possible employment ofnuclear forces.Under such a “modified alert” posture, U.S. SSBNs at sea willno longer patrol at their Cold War launch stations ready to firewithin 15 minutes of receiving the order. The current strictrequirements of speed, depth, navigation and communicationswill be relaxed. Thus the current requirement for alertsubmarines to maintain continuous receive communicationsand readiness to fire almost instantly will be relaxed to 24-72hours – providing greater freedom to train and exercise at seaas an additional benefit. Other measures, such as the removalof “inverters” on submarine missile tubes will be considered toreinforce the new requirement for SSBNs to be able to achievelaunch readiness within but not before this timeline.Similarly, land-based ICBMs will no longer be poised for fullscalelaunches on a moment’s notice. Instead, they will be“safed” in their silos, an existing safety measure (the reversalof which requires maintenance crews to re-enter the silos andflip a switch restoring the launch circuitry), thus precludingtheir launch during normal peacetime conditions and requiringmany hours to reverse.Additional de-alerting steps will be taken. We will consider removingall of the existing wartime targets from the SSBN databasesand ICBM computers. Fully restoring this data wouldtake a number of days, thus building in a larger firebreak –24-72 hours – between the onset of a crisis or conflict and thecapacity to initiate nuclear strike operations.Regarding U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, the forward-basedbombs in Europe assigned to U.S. and NATO allied dual-capableaircraft will remain in their storage vaults and bunkers inpeacetime with force generation capabilities ranging from daysto many months for different portions of the force. The UnitedStates seeks to withdraw these weapons back to U.S. centralstorage locations on the condition that Russia takes reciprocalsteps. Forward-deployed Russian tactical nuclear weapons(~ 800) located at their dozen or so bases on the Europeancontinent (with warheads/bombs stored separately from themissiles and warplanes) would be re-located to Russia’s centralstorage sites (so-called “S” sites). Also, Russia would agree notto introduce nuclear weapons into new locations in Europe includingCrimea. 132 If Russia introduces them into new regions,NATO reserves the right to determine that the security situa-132 See Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission Report, February 2012,op.cit.76
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREStion in Europe has changed sufficiently to justify forward deployingconventional forces or nuclear-capable NATO aircrafton a rotating or permanent basis on the territory of CentralEuropean NATO allies.These changes if fully adopted by Russia as well as the UnitedStates will significantly reduce the risks of premature, mistaken,unauthorized, and accidental use of U.S. and Russian nuclearweapons. The overall effect will be to greatly strengthenstrategic stability.The desired timetable for this transition to a fully de-alertedposture calls for a phased (and verifiable) approach that steadilydecreases the number of strategic weapons on alert. The goalis to reduce to 200-300 alert forces on each side within sevenyears with no more than 100 missile warheads on alert withinthe land-based rocket forces on each side. The remainderwould require 24-72 hours to return to alert. At these loweredlevels no defensible rationale or justification for launch-onwarningcan be made. Off-alert units would periodically rotateback to alert status to relieve units rotating to off alert status.Under this guidance, all of the U.S. ICBM force will be dismantledwithin ten years and therefore U.S. strategic submarineswould assume all alert duties as long as nuclear forcesremain on alert. The United States will seek a total drawdownof U.S. and Russian alert forces by 2025.G. FORCE STRUCTURE, DISPOSITION ANDCRISIS GENERATIONOver the next several years, the United States will face one ofthe weightiest decisions of the post-Cold War era: whether toreplace any or all of its aging strategic nuclear bombers, submarines,and land-based missiles. These decisions have longtermconsequences. They are 50-year decisions for each of thethree types of weapons systems. The longevity of some of theseplatforms would run almost until the end of this century, andthe bill for full-scale modernization of all three componentshas been estimated to run upwards of $400 billion over thenext decade and $1 trillion over the next 30 years. Among otherimpacts, this tab would siphon off funds needed for vitalnon-nuclear defense programs. For instance, funding a replacementstrategic submarine fleet would consume the lion’sshare of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget for many years. It isreasonable to conclude that recapitalization of the U.S. nuclearTriad is unaffordable.Prior to this directive, U.S. nuclear strategy provided amplejustification for undertaking modernization across the board.Under this directive, however, the current U.S. nuclear stockpileis substantially larger than is required for any plausiblemission today and the foreseeable future. Future modernizationprograms will thus be curtailed or scaled back.A U.S. arsenal of 900 total weapons would easily meet reasonablerequirements of deterrence for the next decade and beyond,irrespective of the modernization programs underwayin Russia and China. U.S. modernization will be keyed to thisstockpile size. If and when U.S.-Russian nuclear talks resume,we will pursue this ceiling in the negotiations. The total forceof 900 may consist of strategic and nonstrategic weapons –with “freedom to mix” on both sides – and every individualwarhead or bomb whether deployed or held in reserve wouldbe counted against the ceiling.Although the United States will seek equal Russian reductionsthrough arms talks, we will plan, irrespective of Russianreciprocity, to base our arsenal on a Dyad of strategic nucleardelivery vehicles consisting of ten Trident ballistic missile submarinesand 18 B-2 bombers. All other U.S. nuclear forces willbe retired or converted to carry only conventional weapons.Land-based strategic rockets, B-52 bombers, and tactical forceshave no place in the long-term nuclear future of the UnitedStates. Research and development funding for a Minutemanreplacement missiles will be eliminated from the President’sbudget submitted to Congress.One-half of the planned U.S. force will be deployed with theremainder kept in reserve. 133 As indicated earlier, the deployed133 The current ratio of deployed to reserve warheads is approximately1:2.25. By 2022, it will be possible to achieve a 1:1 ratio. Further progressin increasing warhead interoperability in the out-years would furtherreduce the need for reserve warheads to back up the deployed arsenaland hedge against a systemic defect in any warhead types.77
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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