global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESAccordingly, this report outlines a U.S.-Russia de-alertingregime, taking into account pertinent national and internationalsecurity interests. De-alerting proposals, such as removingwarheads from delivery vehicles and putting themin storage, must be compatible with the basic security interestsof the parties to an agreement or else they will be rejected.Proposals must not be designed and considered in avacuum, solely in narrow technical terms set apart from thecontext of sound national strategy and doctrine, employmentpolicy, force structure, and nuclear command-controlsystems. This wider context and nations’ fundamental securitypriorities, which obviously vary and often diverge fromnation to nation, should shape the contours of de-alertingproposals to ensure that they are useful. To a certain extentthis means that consensus gets built on the lowest commondenominator, but one must begin by considering de-alertingon a case-by-case basis.In the U.S. case, proposals for de-alerting U.S. nuclear forcesare set forth in a fictitious 21st century Nuclear Strategy,Force Posture, and Employment Guidance of the UnitedStates, presented in the form of a forward-looking Presidentialnuclear directive as it might be crafted by the WhiteHouse. This model guidance outlines the elements of anuclear strategy redesigned for the 21st century. The overhaulreduces U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, eliminatesprompt launch (“launch-on-warning”), downsizes the strategicand tactical arsenal, removes the U.S. threat of a counterforcefirst strike against Russia, and otherwise strengthensstrategic stability. De-alerting is a key component ofthe overhaul. The model guidance also frees up resourcesfor the (non-nuclear) tools actually needed by the U.S. militaryand by the decision-makers responsible for managingcrises, and relieves the unaffordable burden of modernizingall three components of the U.S. strategic arsenal. The currentlyplanned nuclear modernization program would costfar more than the Pentagon can afford, produce a force thatexceeds reasonable requirements of deterrence, and shortchangethe non-nuclear programs that the United Statesneeds far more.This model presidential directive takes into account the nationalsecurity priorities of the United States and the otherkey nuclear weapons countries, as well as their positions onde-alerting, as viewed by this report’s experts from China,France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Russia,the United Kingdom and the United States. It seeks tostrengthen security cooperation among them, instead ofdefaulting to the anachronistic organizing principle of mutualdeterrence that governed Cold War relationships. Atthe same time it recognizes that the transition from legacyconstructs like mutual assured destruction to more suitableconstructs like cooperative security is far from complete.In fact it is still in its adolescence. The directive is thereforedriven by “realism” and waxes hard-nosed and conservativein approach. After all, the central purpose of such presidentialdirection is to guide U.S. nuclear planners in preparingfor peacetime, crisis, and wartime operations. It is not everyone’scup of tea.De-alerting would be facilitated by shedding vulnerable silo-basedforces and deploying only survivable weapons. Theoption exists for both Russia and the United States to shiftto a more survivable and de-alerted force – primarily a missilesubmarine force for the United States and a road-mobilemissile force for Russia. U.S.-Russian cooperation couldgreatly facilitate the re-structuring of their nuclear postures,however. The model U.S. presidential directive thus calls forreciprocal Russian de-alerting steps, which are elaboratedalongside the U.S. steps in the appendix. In the initial stageof this de-alerting cooperation between the two nuclearsuperpowers, the overriding and urgent goal is to removelaunch-on-warning from their nuclear operational plans.The <strong>commission</strong> also concludes that coordinated multilateralefforts could prove instrumental in minimizing the<strong>global</strong> risks of nuclear weapons use. This report thereforerecommends that the nuclear weapons countries negotiate averifiable agreement that constrains the attack readiness oftheir nuclear forces, ensuring that they remain off high alertstatus, restricting the scale and schedule of any force generationrequired in the event of a national security emergency,and stipulating protocols for notifying the other signatorieswhenever such generation is undertaken.A multinational de-alerting agreement regulating the nuclearforce postures could greatly mitigate the myriad risks ofnuclear weapons use that currently exist and, as importantly,14
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESstave off future risks. A politically or legally binding agreementamong all the nuclear weapons countries would helpinsulate the nuclear chains of command from human andtechnical dysfunctions that could otherwise cause the useof nuclear weapons and even trigger a nuclear exchange. Itwould offer protection from computer error, cyber seizureof nuclear command and control, accidental detonations,unauthorized “insider” launch, false warning of enemy missileattack, and rushed nuclear decision-making.The de-alerting measures outlined and recommended inthis report are admittedly near-term “stop-gap” steps. Asexplained earlier, a truly optimal de-alerting regime wouldrequire a more fundamental makeover of the U.S. and Russiannuclear force and command structures. They were builtduring the Cold War to maximize attack readiness and rapidforce execution – positive attributes at the time but liabilitiestoday. These postures resist quick fixes to stand them down.For example, the land-based strategic missiles must continuouslyoperate their guidance gyroscopes in peacetimeto remain reliable. If they are powered down and taken offalert, they could not be restarted reliably. The guidance systemsbecome prone to malfunction during such a re-boot.Both countries need to go back to the drawing boards tore-configure their nuclear forces and command systems tomake them “de-alerting friendly.” For the United States, thisprobably means that its silo-based missiles should be eliminatedentirely. Modernization plans also need to build infeatures that make the job of de-alerting easier. Meanwhile,this report proposes a set of practical if not optimal ad hocremedies.IV. STILL AN ANARCHIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMIn the post-Cold War era it seems almost unimaginable thatstates could become embroiled in confrontations that escalateto the level of nuclear brinksmanship or worse. Thegrowing interconnectedness and interdependencies amongnations in the 21st century have made major conventionalwar extremely costly and nuclear war unthinkable. Thesethickening sinews of international stability include instantaneousworldwide communications and information transfer,rapidly growing trade, massive flows of people and corporationsacross national boundaries, and the dramatic riseof direct foreign investment and <strong>global</strong> debt underwriting.Economic clout increasingly overshadows military might asthe currency of power. And an expanding constellation ofelectoral democracies (tripling in number since the 1970sand growing from 70 to 125 during the past 25 years) 8 hasemerged. History shows that democracies do not wage warwith each other. Despite counter-<strong>global</strong>ization trends insome isolated cases – notably, the partial re-nationalizationand de-<strong>global</strong>ization in evidence in Russian state capitalismand in its societal introversion, and the pre-<strong>global</strong>izationstasis of the North Korean hermit kingdom – as well as theebbing of democracy in a dozen key nations, the tide of historyis heading inexorably toward greater integration of the195 sovereign nations in the world. And this tide is ineluctablyeroding the role of the threat of nuclear weapons use oractual use in arbitrating the outcome of inter-state conflict.Further marginalizing this waning role are the elusivethreats to international security emerging from the samedynamics of <strong>global</strong>ization. Globalization allows increasinglylethal technologies to propagate around the world – spreadingeven to insular states like North Korea (recipient of nucleartechnology transfers), failing states like Libya (recipientof nuclear transfers before imploding during the ArabSpring) and sub-state groups like Hamas (recipient of technologiesfor building rockets with sufficient range to assaultTel Aviv). The world is bracing for even worse: the inevitableacquisition of truly deadly biological pathogens or nuclearweapons by non-state actors, enabling even small groups ofindividuals to cause mass casualties.The world’s nuclear stockpile offers scant defense against thespread and use of virulent weapons by imploding states andfanatical terrorists. It also offers scant political or militaryleverage over nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare threats, ornuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. In many respectsthe world’s 16,000 nuclear weapons create the problem, notthe solution to these <strong>global</strong> ills. They do not solve the problemof loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorists, for8 Freedom in the World 2015, Freedom House, 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf,p.6.15
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