global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESXIV. 21 ST CENTURY NUCLEAR SECURITYSTRATEGY, FORCE POSTURE AND EMPLOYMENTGUIDANCE OF THE UNITED STATESA. INTRODUCTIONU.S. <strong>nuclear</strong> strategy, with its central organizing principleof mutual assured destructi<strong>on</strong>, has been running <strong>on</strong> inertiafor decades. Firmly anchored in 20 th Century and ColdWar thinking, it rati<strong>on</strong>alizes a stockpile that far exceeds reas<strong>on</strong>ablerequirements of deterrence in the post-Cold Warera, a <strong>nuclear</strong> posture that runs excessive <strong>risk</strong> of inadvertentlaunch, and a modernizati<strong>on</strong> program that the nati<strong>on</strong>cannot afford and does not need. More broadly, it incursopportunity costs by hobbling our ability to foster internati<strong>on</strong>alcooperati<strong>on</strong> in solving the biggest <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> challengesof our age. Put simply, U.S. <strong>nuclear</strong> strategy in its currentform poorly serves U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al security interests. A sharpcourse correcti<strong>on</strong> in strategy is needed today, relying less <strong>on</strong><strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s organized around the c<strong>on</strong>cept of mutualassured destructi<strong>on</strong> and shifting to a “total triad c<strong>on</strong>cept”with increasing emphasis <strong>on</strong> n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> capabilities in thec<strong>on</strong>text of greater pursuit of security cooperati<strong>on</strong> with Russiaand China. What follows is a new set of principles andgoals to be pursued immediately.B. GENERALThe United States would be far more secure in a world without<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s. The total worldwide eliminati<strong>on</strong> of<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s is therefore a high-priority goal. The timehoriz<strong>on</strong> for achieving it is undoubtedly l<strong>on</strong>g but c<strong>on</strong>crete andinstrumental steps must be taken in the near future, includingan intensified effort by the United States to reduce our dependence<strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, work with other countries toreduce their reliance <strong>on</strong> them, and bring all <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>scountries into a multilateral process of <strong>nuclear</strong> arms c<strong>on</strong>trolfor the phased, proporti<strong>on</strong>al, and verifiable reducti<strong>on</strong> of theirstockpiles.In the interim, we must always ensure the security, reliability,and safety of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s until the last of them arepermanently dismantled. We also must eliminate vulnerableforces and reduce our reliance <strong>on</strong> prompt-launch in a crisis.These aims will be pursued bilaterally and multilaterally, butwe also will take appropriate independent steps that serve thebest interests of U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al security. The result should be afundamental and stabilizing re-orientati<strong>on</strong> of strategic arsenalsand postures toward a broader strategy with n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong>offense and defense pillars as well as survivable <strong>nuclear</strong> comp<strong>on</strong>ents.In furtherance of our commitment to seek a world without<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, the Nati<strong>on</strong>al Security Council will coordinatethe Departments of Defense, State and Energy, and theNati<strong>on</strong>al Nuclear Security Agency to complete within sixm<strong>on</strong>ths a detailed acti<strong>on</strong> plan of the steps that would need tobe accomplished in order to achieve <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>zero</str<strong>on</strong>g> within a 20-to 40-year timeframe. Assuming these alternative target dates,the analysis should work back to the present to specify andelaborate the implicati<strong>on</strong>s for the (i) <strong>nuclear</strong> force structure,command-c<strong>on</strong>trol-communicati<strong>on</strong>s-early warning networks,and operati<strong>on</strong>al posture including security and safety measures,(ii) <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s complex, including the nati<strong>on</strong>allaboratories and other infrastructure involved in maintainingstockpile reliability and in dismantling weap<strong>on</strong>s, and (iii)arms c<strong>on</strong>trol strategy, including a timeline for negotiatingphased, verified reducti<strong>on</strong>s leading to the total eliminati<strong>on</strong> of<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s in all countries.This comprehensive study should include a c<strong>on</strong>tingency planin the event that the objectives and timelines of some of thec<strong>on</strong>stituent parts – e.g., reaching arms c<strong>on</strong>trol agreementswith adequate verificati<strong>on</strong> provisi<strong>on</strong>s – are not met. The planmust allow for flexible adjustments to the blueprint including,if circumstances dictate, a suspensi<strong>on</strong> or even reversal of thesteps in the process.The spread of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s technology around the worldand the specter of its intenti<strong>on</strong>al or unintended use lend urgencyto the <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>zero</str<strong>on</strong>g> agenda and at the same time hamperprogress toward its achievement. The United States itselftoday faces an ever-growing array of potential situati<strong>on</strong>s inwhich it may land in the middle of a volatile crisis or c<strong>on</strong>flictwith the potential to escalate to <strong>nuclear</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict. In some cases,the pressure to resort first to <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s may weighheaviest <strong>on</strong> the United States even when the immediate threat70