global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESXIV. 21 ST CENTURY NUCLEAR SECURITYSTRATEGY, FORCE POSTURE AND EMPLOYMENTGUIDANCE OF THE UNITED STATESA. INTRODUCTIONU.S. nuclear strategy, with its central organizing principleof mutual assured destruction, has been running on inertiafor decades. Firmly anchored in 20 th Century and ColdWar thinking, it rationalizes a stockpile that far exceeds reasonablerequirements of deterrence in the post-Cold Warera, a nuclear posture that runs excessive risk of inadvertentlaunch, and a modernization program that the nationcannot afford and does not need. More broadly, it incursopportunity costs by hobbling our ability to foster internationalcooperation in solving the biggest <strong>global</strong> challengesof our age. Put simply, U.S. nuclear strategy in its currentform poorly serves U.S. national security interests. A sharpcourse correction in strategy is needed today, relying less onnuclear weapons organized around the concept of mutualassured destruction and shifting to a “total triad concept”with increasing emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities in thecontext of greater pursuit of security cooperation with Russiaand China. What follows is a new set of principles andgoals to be pursued immediately.B. GENERALThe United States would be far more secure in a world withoutnuclear weapons. The total worldwide elimination ofnuclear weapons is therefore a high-priority goal. The timehorizon for achieving it is undoubtedly long but concrete andinstrumental steps must be taken in the near future, includingan intensified effort by the United States to reduce our dependenceon nuclear weapons, work with other countries toreduce their reliance on them, and bring all nuclear weaponscountries into a multilateral process of nuclear arms controlfor the phased, proportional, and verifiable reduction of theirstockpiles.In the interim, we must always ensure the security, reliability,and safety of nuclear weapons until the last of them arepermanently dismantled. We also must eliminate vulnerableforces and reduce our reliance on prompt-launch in a crisis.These aims will be pursued bilaterally and multilaterally, butwe also will take appropriate independent steps that serve thebest interests of U.S. national security. The result should be afundamental and stabilizing re-orientation of strategic arsenalsand postures toward a broader strategy with non-nuclearoffense and defense pillars as well as survivable nuclear components.In furtherance of our commitment to seek a world withoutnuclear weapons, the National Security Council will coordinatethe Departments of Defense, State and Energy, and theNational Nuclear Security Agency to complete within sixmonths a detailed action plan of the steps that would need tobe accomplished in order to achieve <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong> within a 20-to 40-year timeframe. Assuming these alternative target dates,the analysis should work back to the present to specify andelaborate the implications for the (i) nuclear force structure,command-control-communications-early warning networks,and operational posture including security and safety measures,(ii) nuclear weapons complex, including the nationallaboratories and other infrastructure involved in maintainingstockpile reliability and in dismantling weapons, and (iii)arms control strategy, including a timeline for negotiatingphased, verified reductions leading to the total elimination ofnuclear weapons in all countries.This comprehensive study should include a contingency planin the event that the objectives and timelines of some of theconstituent parts – e.g., reaching arms control agreementswith adequate verification provisions – are not met. The planmust allow for flexible adjustments to the blueprint including,if circumstances dictate, a suspension or even reversal of thesteps in the process.The spread of nuclear weapons technology around the worldand the specter of its intentional or unintended use lend urgencyto the <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong> agenda and at the same time hamperprogress toward its achievement. The United States itselftoday faces an ever-growing array of potential situations inwhich it may land in the middle of a volatile crisis or conflictwith the potential to escalate to nuclear conflict. In some cases,the pressure to resort first to nuclear weapons may weighheaviest on the United States even when the immediate threat70
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESto U.S. interests is cyber, conventional, chemical, or biological.In such scenarios, nuclear options may be the only immediatelyavailable tools in the President’s kitbag. This deficiencyhas been responsible for the past presidential decisions not toendorse “sole-purpose” in U.S. doctrine.This deficiency must be remedied immediately. The Presidentmust have effective non-nuclear options readily available. Asan integral part of the <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong> study effort, the Departmentof Defense therefore will give high priority to expandingconventional options, to include options with cyber warfare,missile defense, special operations, and passive defense components.The Defense Department will assess deficiencies inthese options, and develop new capabilities that remedy theshortfalls and increase the President’s nuclear decision timeand flexibility of response. The department’s assessment willalso assess their net effect on crisis stability insofar as theyincorporate “disruptive technologies.”To further expand the President’s “decision space” for dealingwith situations prone to nuclear escalation, the State andTreasury Departments will conduct a parallel study to preparenew diplomatic and financial instruments for preventingand managing crises. The two departments together with theNSC will intensify their simulation, gaming, and exercises tobetter anticipate, comprehend, prevent, and contain the regionalconflicts in which the United States may find itself inthe future.These efforts presuppose a comprehensive analysis of currentand future threats to key sectors of the nuclear-weaponsenterprise including manufacturing, assembly, storage, mating,and operations. The Defense Department will conductthis threat assessment. Against the vulnerabilities identifiedthe department will identify modern technology that woulddecrease risk and increase safety, security, and surety. Thistechnology, coupled with resilient command and control andactive, passive and conventional offensive and defensive forces– including regional missile defenses – should effectivelyaddress the emergent threats associated with terrorism andcyber warfare, and mitigate or eliminate Cold War constructs,especially “use-or-lose” and “hair-trigger” alert postures.C. RUSSIA AND CHINAThe primary objective of U.S. nuclear strategy is to achievemaximum stability in our relations with China and Russiain order to prevent nuclear conflict with them. Other highpriorities are to expunge nuclear threats from our relationships,strengthen security cooperation and gain their supportin advancing the goal of <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong>. We seek over time toreplace the anachronistic organizing principle of mutual assureddestruction that governed our Cold War relationshipsand organize our relations around security cooperation. Thistransition is underway, but it is unfinished business. Mutualnuclear threat remains a receding, but still distinctive featureof our current relations.China and Russia are neither allies nor enemies. We oftenforge pragmatic partnerships to address pressing <strong>global</strong> securitychallenges. The United States shares with them a commoninterest in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our relationsas well as our relations with other nuclear and non-nuclearstates. Through U.S. declaratory and employment policy,the United States will clearly convey to China and Russia thatit is not U.S. intent to negate their nuclear forces, introducenew threats, or in any way destabilize our military relations.The United States will take steps to eliminate the constant projectionof nuclear threat at China and Russia that is embodiedin the U.S. nuclear force structure, operational posture, andplanning enterprise. Within the near term future, the UnitedStates will, according to the <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong> road map to be completedin six months, reduce the size of our arsenal, removea portion of our forces from launch-ready alert status, andshorten the wartime target list. The Minuteman land-basedmissile component of the U.S. strategic Triad will be phasedout over the next ten years. Minuteman forces have almostno other mission than to engage Russia in large-scale nuclearconflict, or engage China and Russia simultaneously in largescaleconflict. These missions are virtually obsolete. Minutemanforces are also vulnerable to Russian counterforce attackand depend on prompt launch for their survival. This exigencyimposes an excessively hasty timeline on presidential decision-makingand severely constrains the President’s flexibilityin responding to attack indications. Flexible response remains71
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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