global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESExcerpts from the Russian study “Strategic Stability and Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century.” 77In this opti<strong>on</strong>, <strong>nuclear</strong> deterrence rests up<strong>on</strong> 500 deployed strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, with the remainder in active reserve […]Nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s being held in active reserve can be taken from storage and loaded <strong>on</strong> transporters over a period of several weeksto several m<strong>on</strong>ths (and this cannot be d<strong>on</strong>e discreetly.) Moreover, it is feasible to maintain a large porti<strong>on</strong> (80-85 percent) of deployedstrategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s in a state of low readiness (they could be activated within 24-72 hours).Thus, within a maximum of 72 hours in Russia, 590 strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, ready for immediate acti<strong>on</strong> could be deployed.This is sufficient for an adequate resp<strong>on</strong>se to any emergency. In the event of a protracted <strong>nuclear</strong> crisis or a sharp deteriorati<strong>on</strong> ingeostrategic relati<strong>on</strong>s between Russia and the United States or China, which would last for a period of several weeks or m<strong>on</strong>ths,there would be ample opportunity to bring into readiness all the 1,000 strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s.In our opini<strong>on</strong>, if we take as a starting point the seriousness of the political leadership of Russia and the United States to movetowards a <strong>nuclear</strong>-free world the most preferable opti<strong>on</strong> is [this <strong>on</strong>e]. However, this opti<strong>on</strong> can hardly be realized without theparticipati<strong>on</strong> of other <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s states, above all, China.The ability of the Russian strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forces to deliver 1,000 strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s to their targets poses a threat of unacceptabledamage to any potential aggressor. The current high operati<strong>on</strong>al readiness for the launch of the strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> missiles(alert status) in Russia and the United States creates unwarranted <strong>risk</strong> and mistrust between the two countries. It is impossiblenow to imagine a situati<strong>on</strong> when either Russia or the United States suddenly decided to make a pre-emptive <strong>nuclear</strong> strike againstthe other side. There is simply no motivati<strong>on</strong> for such an act. Therefore, the readiness to launch <strong>nuclear</strong> missiles should be reducedand brought into line with the existing military-political realities of Russian-American relati<strong>on</strong>s. Even if steps were taken to moveall the <strong>nuclear</strong> missiles of Russia and the United States to a reduced state of readiness, the ability of Moscow and Washingt<strong>on</strong> tomaintain <strong>nuclear</strong> deterrence will not suffer, since in the foreseeable future there is no motivati<strong>on</strong> by other <strong>nuclear</strong> powers for asurprise <strong>nuclear</strong> attack <strong>on</strong> the Russia or the United States.Russia’s military and political leaders c<strong>on</strong>sider the possessi<strong>on</strong> of n<strong>on</strong>strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s as the most important deterrencefactor at a regi<strong>on</strong>al level […] Therefore, in c<strong>on</strong>trast to the United States, which does not feel the need to deter its neighbors, Russiacannot aband<strong>on</strong> n<strong>on</strong>strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s. At the same time, in the face of modern realities, the size of the Russian n<strong>on</strong>strategic<strong>nuclear</strong> arsenal seems excessive (the estimated active reserve of Russian n<strong>on</strong>strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s is about 2,000 units).The arsenal can be reduced to about 500 weap<strong>on</strong>s by eliminating those types of <strong>nuclear</strong> systems, which have lost their militarysignificance (ground-to-air missiles, depth charges, mines, etc.), and by reducing the number of tactical air <strong>nuclear</strong> missiles andbombs.Of course, the U.S.-Russian agreement to reduce <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, as described above, may not be sufficient to maintain the military-strategicbalance, if we accept the “broad” definiti<strong>on</strong> of strategic stability, which <strong>on</strong> the <strong>on</strong>e hand, should take into accountn<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> strategic systems, and <strong>on</strong> the other, the multipolar nature of the modern world. It should be noted that limiting themilitarizati<strong>on</strong> of space and the development of cyber weap<strong>on</strong>s will have a greater impact <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> stability. Clearly, the maintenanceof strategic stability in the multipolar world in the 21 st Century will require new efforts to address the serious threats posedby these areas of military competiti<strong>on</strong>, as proposed in the Global Zero <strong>report</strong>.77 Sergey Rogov, Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev, and Vice Adm. (Ret.) Valentin Kuznetsov, Report by the RussianAcademy of Sciences presented at the RIAC-Global Zero C<strong>on</strong>ference, Moscow, Nov. 8, 2012.42