global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

Recommendations

Info

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESExcerpts from the Russian study “Strategic Stability and Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century.” 77In this option, nuclear deterrence rests upon 500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, with the remainder in active reserve […]Nuclear weapons being held in active reserve can be taken from storage and loaded on transporters over a period of several weeksto several months (and this cannot be done discreetly.) Moreover, it is feasible to maintain a large portion (80-85 percent) of deployedstrategic nuclear weapons in a state of low readiness (they could be activated within 24-72 hours).Thus, within a maximum of 72 hours in Russia, 590 strategic nuclear weapons, ready for immediate action could be deployed.This is sufficient for an adequate response to any emergency. In the event of a protracted nuclear crisis or a sharp deterioration ingeostrategic relations between Russia and the United States or China, which would last for a period of several weeks or months,there would be ample opportunity to bring into readiness all the 1,000 strategic nuclear weapons.In our opinion, if we take as a starting point the seriousness of the political leadership of Russia and the United States to movetowards a nuclear-free world the most preferable option is [this one]. However, this option can hardly be realized without theparticipation of other nuclear weapons states, above all, China.The ability of the Russian strategic nuclear forces to deliver 1,000 strategic nuclear weapons to their targets poses a threat of unacceptabledamage to any potential aggressor. The current high operational readiness for the launch of the strategic nuclear missiles(alert status) in Russia and the United States creates unwarranted risk and mistrust between the two countries. It is impossiblenow to imagine a situation when either Russia or the United States suddenly decided to make a pre-emptive nuclear strike againstthe other side. There is simply no motivation for such an act. Therefore, the readiness to launch nuclear missiles should be reducedand brought into line with the existing military-political realities of Russian-American relations. Even if steps were taken to moveall the nuclear missiles of Russia and the United States to a reduced state of readiness, the ability of Moscow and Washington tomaintain nuclear deterrence will not suffer, since in the foreseeable future there is no motivation by other nuclear powers for asurprise nuclear attack on the Russia or the United States.Russia’s military and political leaders consider the possession of nonstrategic nuclear weapons as the most important deterrencefactor at a regional level […] Therefore, in contrast to the United States, which does not feel the need to deter its neighbors, Russiacannot abandon nonstrategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, in the face of modern realities, the size of the Russian nonstrategicnuclear arsenal seems excessive (the estimated active reserve of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons is about 2,000 units).The arsenal can be reduced to about 500 weapons by eliminating those types of nuclear systems, which have lost their militarysignificance (ground-to-air missiles, depth charges, mines, etc.), and by reducing the number of tactical air nuclear missiles andbombs.Of course, the U.S.-Russian agreement to reduce nuclear weapons, as described above, may not be sufficient to maintain the military-strategicbalance, if we accept the “broad” definition of strategic stability, which on the one hand, should take into accountnon-nuclear strategic systems, and on the other, the multipolar nature of the modern world. It should be noted that limiting themilitarization of space and the development of cyber weapons will have a greater impact on <strong>global</strong> stability. Clearly, the maintenanceof strategic stability in the multipolar world in the 21 st Century will require new efforts to address the serious threats posedby these areas of military competition, as proposed in the Global Zero report.77 Sergey Rogov, Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pavel Zolotarev, and Vice Adm. (Ret.) Valentin Kuznetsov, Report by the RussianAcademy of Sciences presented at the RIAC-Global Zero Conference, Moscow, Nov. 8, 2012.42
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESDe-alerting is thus consonant with Russia’s national interest,in the view of these seasoned national security experts.Russia has a vital security interest in preventing nuclear proliferationand nuclear terrorist attack against its homeland,as well as other nations using nuclear materials or weaponsstolen from Russia’s own stockpile.Russia identifies other potential threats besides terrorism, however,and as this report previously emphasized Russia does notpossess a large kitbag of “soft” and “hard” power tools to dealwith them. Although Russia is mastering a range of low-intensitytools such as those that fall under the rubric of “hybrid”warfare, Russia’s strength lies at the very low and very high endof the spectrum of conflict – and Russia therefore finds it necessaryto rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter, dissuade, and inextremis to suppress the middle-range threats.As noted earlier, both China and the United States/NATOfigure prominently in Russian threat assessment. Russiaviews its nuclear arsenal as essential to offsetting conventionalinferiority as well as deterring the opposing nuclearforces. While Russia’s conventional forces can overpowerweak nations on its periphery, they cannot handle NATOor China, and therefore Russia would be forced to reach forthe nuclear cudgel at a relatively early stage of conventionalwar. Thus the emergence of nuclear “de-escalatory escalation”discussed above. And thus the continuation of its legacyposture of strategic nuclear vigilance that keeps nearly800 warheads always at the ready.But as these Russian experts underscore in their report,Russia needs far fewer of them on far lower states of attackreadiness. It can afford to relax its posture in tandem withU.S. de-alerting and still meet reasonable requirements ofdeterrence, and at the same time Russia cannot afford notto undertake this reciprocal de-alerting if it wishes to reduceits exposure to accidental, unauthorized, and mistakenlaunches by both sides. De-alerting would work to eliminatethis danger as well as Russia’s exposure to nuclear terrorism.As the Russian experts reiterate, Russia predicates much of itssupport for the de-alerting agenda as well as deep reductions innuclear stockpiles on cooperative efforts to resolve several specificissues led by missile defenses and conventional imbalances.The model U.S. presidential guidance recognizes this predicateand calls for redoubled efforts to find solutions, such asproposing that the United States would count all of its strategicand theater ground- and sea-based missile defense interceptorsagainst its New START ceiling of operationally deployedweapons. (A single deployed interceptor could be treated as theequivalent of a single deployed nuclear warhead.) Assuming aconstructive dialogue and real progress on the broader securityagenda, Russia should be amenable to negotiating a far-reachingbilateral de-alerting agreement – but the absence of suchprogress should not preclude Russia from accepting an agreementwith modest initial objectives. If headway can be madetoward a bilateral agreement, Russia should be amenable to engagingin multilateral discussions aimed at a broader de-alertingagreement.B. CHINAAlthough China is in the middle of a long-planned programof nuclear modernization, 78 it has been exemplary in its nuclearrestraint: building only a modest nuclear arsenal (
Page 3 and 4: GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSIONON NUCLEAR RI
Page 7: TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
Page 10 and 11: GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR R
Page 30: GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR R
Page 49: GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR R

global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?