global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESand engage in bilateral discussion on disarmament andnon-proliferation. 126The details of the Lahore Declaration were left in limboas fighting over Kargil soon broke out. The declarationserved as the basis for further dialogue between the twocountries on various bilateral matters, including talks onthe nuclear risk-reducing CBMs noted above. However,these talks have been intermittent and not been veryfruitful. The talks resumed in 2011 after the 2008 Mumbaiattacks. They have largely been handled by mid-levelofficials. One obstacle is that while India believes nuclearCBMs should be kept separate from conventional CBMs,Pakistan views these strands as intertwined.Some experts suggest revitalizing the talks with visits byheads of state and getting the International Atomic EnergyAgency involved as a trusted facilitator in normalizingsecurity relations between India and Pakistan. 127 Mostrecently, India cancelled a meeting between their foreignministers scheduled for August 2014 after Pakistani officialsmet with the Hurriyat movement (a non-governmentalpolitical front calling for Kashmiri independence),which India viewed as Pakistani meddling in India’s internalaffairs.South Asia – Ottawa Dialogue and De-Alerting. The OttawaDialogue involves talks on South Asian nuclear issuesbetween senior retired officials and academics fromIndia and Pakistan. This forum recently recommended aseries of steps to improve strategic stability in the region,calling on the two sides to:• Maintain their unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosivetesting;• Maintain their nuclear weapons in a de-mated,de-alerted and non-deployed status;• Renounce strikes against each other’s national commandauthorities;• Renounce destabilizing military doctrines;• Agree to further mechanisms to prevent inadvertentnuclear escalation, including further CBMs (e.g., establishin each country a strategic risk managementunit);• Further strengthen the safety and security of theirnuclear warheads and fissile material during storage,transportation and handling; and• Reassure the other that stable command and controlsystems will be maintained especially in light ofchanging and advancing technologies. 128Middle East – Arms Control and Regional Security. TheArms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) workinggroup was set up to work to apply confidence-buildingmeasures to the Middle East and broadly discuss a nuclearweapons- or weapons of mass destruction-free zone.A wide gap between Israeli and Arab priorities on armscontrol emerged. Israel insisted that the first steps towardarms control and denuclearization consist of transparencyCBMs, while Egypt suggested that all parties in the regionfirst sign existing nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponstreaties and allow international inspections. Furtherdisagreements centered on Israel’s lack of confidence inIAEA safeguards provided under the NPT insistence upona tight and complementary regional verification regime.Conversely, Egypt maintains that the existing IAEA regimeis sufficient. 129ACRS talks ended in 1995. Middle East nations have heldtalks on establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone, but thesetalks have been hampered by the same issues as well as Israelireluctance in using the NPT regime for the process.126 “Lahore Declaration,” signed February 21, 1999, (posted by UnitedStates Institute for Peace, Feb 23, 1999), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf.127 Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Sees Need for New Approach in Pakistan-IndiaNuclear Talks,” Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative,Aug 2, 2012, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-sees-need-new-approachpakistan-india-nuclear-talks/.128 “Elements of Strategic Stability in South Asia,” Ottawa Dialoguemeeting, Oct 8, 2013, https://app.box.com/s/g45q2r9xdrdh9sflcv44129 Holly Higgins, “Applying Confidence-Building Measures in aRegional Context,” paper presented at the Building Nuclear Confidenceon the Korean Peninsula workshop of the Institute for Science and InternationalSecurity, Washington, D.C., July 23-24, 2001. http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/higginspaper.pdf68
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESKorean Peninsula – Six-Party Talks. North and SouthKorea entered into agreements in the 1990s 130 that dealtwith nuclear weapons on the peninsula, which were laterabandoned by North Korea as the state continued to developits nuclear weapons program.The Six-Party Talks are a succession of multilateral discussionson denuclearizing North Korea attended by theChina, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and theUnited States. After the fourth round of talks in 2005, aJoint Statement was issued that contained commitmentfrom all parties to the goal of verifiable denuclearizationin a peaceful manner of the peninsula and agreed uponsteps toward North Korean denuclearization, including:131XIII. DE-ALERTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTSAny de-alerting regime must be integrated into the broaderframework of Chinese, Russian, U.S. and others’ nationalsecurity interests and strategies as well as their nuclear policies.Such integration is not a narrow technical exercise. Itdemands direction from the highest levels.The following illustrative directive from the U.S. presidentoutlines the contours of a U.S. de-alerting regime within theframework of a shift in U.S. security strategy from “mutualassured destruction” to “mutual assured security.”• Agreeing to discuss the provision of light water reactorto North Korea for peaceful purposes;• Normalizing relations, specifically between NorthKorea and the United States and North Korea and Japan;• Promoting economic cooperation in the fields of energy,tradem and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally,including providing electrical energy toNorth Korea;• Committing to joint efforts for lasting peace and stabilityin Northeast Asia through negotiation of a permanentpeace regime on the Korean Peninsula at anappropriate separate forum; and• Agreeing to explore ways and means for promotingsecurity cooperation in Northeast Asia.No new achievements were made at successive talks withthe last round occurring in 2008.130 For example, the North-South Basic Agreement signed in December1991 in which both countries agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty;resolve disputes peacefully; and establish a joint military <strong>commission</strong>to negotiate confidence-building measures including arms reductions,the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, notification of militaryexercises, verification mechanisms, and the installation of a hotlinebetween national military authorities.131 See U.S. department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Roundof the Six-Party Talks,” Beijing: September 19, 2005.69
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