global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES15. Agree to a range of confidence-building stipulationsthat regulate the scope and timing of any re-alertingthat may be undertaken for any reason – training,exercising, crisis preparedness, or rotationalassumption of alert to relieve forces coming downfrom alert. Besides limiting the scope and timing ofsuch re-alerting, they will agree to give advance notificationof any re-alerting activity according to anaccepted protocol.16. Reaffirm commitment to 1991 Presidential NuclearInitiatives on eliminating nuclear weapons.17. Resume nuclear talks to resolve several specific hurdlesto arms control progress led by missile defensesand conventional imbalances in order to get nuclearsecurity cooperation back on track. Redouble effortsto find creative solutions, such as proposing to countall strategic and theater ground- and sea-based missiledefense interceptors against its New START ceilingof operationally deployed weapons.18. Other recommended steps: Establish 100-mile exclusionzones for U.S. missile defense deployments adjacentto Russian territory; exchange data on non-strategicnuclear warheads destroyed in the past 20 years;visit each other’s former naval and air force storagesites to ensure that non-strategic nuclear weapons(NSNWs) – tactical weapons – are not available forquick re-deployment; exchange declarations of intentof nuclear use including emphasizing that a strong nucleardeterrent does not require the ability to retaliateimmediately; establish formal, recurring joint seminarson nuclear doctrines and NSNWs employment;exchange declarations on missile defense programsfor the next ten years; share information on currentlocations, types and numbers of NSNWs; pledge tobe transparent about plans to modernize NSNWs;exchange information on command agreements, operationalstatus and operational security levels; agreeto separate NSNWs from delivery vehicles and keepthem de-mated; and transfer NSNWs to centralizedstorage sites, and provide advance notification whenmoving NSNWs from their current locations.19. Appoint a track II <strong>commission</strong> of experts to assess therecommendations of this report and advise governmentson next steps.B. MULTILATERAL STEPSThis <strong>commission</strong> believes that de-alerting would alsoserve the national security interests of a far larger constellationof nations including the nuclear possessor states ofChina, the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan and India,and Israel as a unique case, as well as key non-nuclearweapons countries that shelter under the umbrella of extendeddeterrence.The <strong>commission</strong> supports these multilateral steps:1. The nuclear weapons countries meet to begin consultationslaying the groundwork for a multilateralagreement limiting the alert status of their nuclearforces.2. China, India, and Pakistan, who regularly join therest of the nations in the United Nations GeneralAssembly in passing resolutions calling for the nuclearweapons countries to decrease the operationalreadiness of their nuclear forces, assume a leadingrole in the initial <strong>global</strong> de-alerting consultations andin subsequent negotiations to reach a multilateralde-alerting agreement.3. France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the UnitedKingdom participate in these consultations and negotiationsand contribute to their success by sharinginformation on their alert status, plans for de-alerting,approach to verification, and monitoring technologiesand techniques.4. Russia and the United States invite the other nuclearweapons countries as well as key non-nuclear weaponscountries to join the joint early warning center tobe established for the purposes outlined earlier – par-88