global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESthe following lines:Regarding nuclear weapons storage in peacetime, all arekept disassembled under the custody of non-military departments,primarily the Department of Atomic Energy(DAE). 20 Some warheads and bombs are “near-mated” andfinal assembly could be accomplished in short order. Themajority of weapons have two separated parts: the nuclearcore (i.e., the plutonium pit) and the non-explosive assembly.A small number in the Indian stockpile have these partsconjoined as “sealed pit warheads.” 21 The delivery vehicles– aircraft and missiles – in all cases are located at militarybases removed from the warhead storage sites.India’s nuclear planners have produced a “Red Book” for nuclearcrisis and war, which defines roles and responsibilitiesfor each nuclear commander at each stage of a confrontationand conflict. 22 Planners established a four-stage ladderof readiness (from lowest, or fourth stage, to highest, or firststage):4. Arming the weapon.3. Dispersing the armed weapons to avoid destructionby a counterforce first strike.2. Mating of the weapon to the delivery system/launcher.1. Turning control of the ready-to-use weapon to themilitary user.In a crisis warranting an increase in nuclear attack readiness,the weapons would be flown by helicopters and airplanes toairbases and missile garrisons where they would marry upwith the warplanes and missiles. 23 Non-military personnelfrom DAE or other agencies would apparently accompanythis transfer and at some stage in the mating process theywould unlock the weapons to enable them to be employedby India’s armed forces upon the latter’s receipt of the strikeorder. Unlike Russia and the United States, and possiblyChina, India evidently does not have the ability to transmitthese codes directly by electronic means from the nationalcommand centers to the forces. It is a more labor-intensiveprocess.The time required to mobilize the nuclear forces and generatethem to maximum attack readiness would be measuredin days and weeks. Once they are readied for combat at ahigh level of alert, very few steps, such as unlock code insertion,would be needed to fire them. At this high level of alertin the field, the goal of Indian nuclear doctrine is to be ableto fire them within about 30 minutes, and no more than oneto two hours. 24India’s subscribes to a no-first-use policy that is somewhatmore conditional than is commonly known. Two qualificationsmerit highlighting: (i) nuclear weapons can be usedin retaliation to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or onIndian forces anywhere, and (ii) India retains the option ofnuclear retaliation to a major biological or chemical weaponsattack against India or Indian forces. 25After the Mumbai massacre in 2008, India devised a newplan for rapid, limited conventional operations in responseto terrorist attacks. The so-called “Cold Start” strategy,which aims to enable India to insert forces into Pakistan in72-96 hours, enjoys strong military support but unenthusiasticpolitical support. This skepticism stems in part fromPakistan’s threat to use tactical nuclear weapons againstIndian forces participating in “Cold Start” operations. Inorder to combat the Pakistani notion that its limited useof nuclear weapons would not trigger a full-scale nuclearwar, India has threatened massive nuclear retaliation to any20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 This paragraph draws on Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport,CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 99.23 This paragraph draws on Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces,op.cit., pp. 147-48.24 Jasjit Singh, Reshaping Asian Security (Ann Arbor, MI: KnowledgeWorld, June 1, 2001), p. 149 as quoted by Verghese Koithara, ManagingIndia’s Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2012), p. 147.25 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” in Major Power’s NuclearPolicies and International Order in the 21st century (Tokyo: NationalInstitute for Defense Studies, 2010), p. 100.24
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESnuclear attack on any scale.Regarding the nuclear chain of command, the StrategicForces Command (SFC), headed by a senior officer fromthe Indian Army, Air Force or Navy on a rotational basis,commands the land-based missile forces. Naval and airforce units are dual-capable (configured to employ eithernuclear or conventional armaments) and remain in the parentservice until a crisis arises, at which time they “chop”(transfer over) to the SFC and receive specific nuclear missionsand targets.The prime minister authorizes their use through the NationalSecurity Council. The deputy prime minister or a Cabinetminister may assume this authority as a successor in theevent of the prime minister’s incapacitation during conflict.Approval of use passes down to the chairman of the Chiefsof Staff Committee, and then to the Commander in Chief ofthe Strategic Forces Command, which is responsible for thedeployment, targeting, and employment of nuclear forces.A two-man rule for arming and launching nuclear weaponsand a system of firing codes and electronic interlocks havebeen put in place to enhance security at lower levels in thechain of command. In the event of a decapitating nuclearstrike that wipes out the top leadership, commanders in thefield reportedly can take matters into their own hands andretaliate at their own discretion. 26As India “operationalizes” it nuclear forces, it is improvingthe resilience and reliability of nuclear control, but it stillneeds to substantially strengthen both positive control (thecapability to survive and carry out wartime missions) andnegative control (the capability to prevent accidental, unauthorized,or inadvertent use). And India needs to locate andstrike an appropriate balance between positive and negativecontrol. Meanwhile, the Indian nuclear posture carries risk.It is not as survivable, stable, and controllable as it needs tobe. Its virtues bear noting, however. It provides for a lowlevel of alert, relatively ample warning and decision time,26 Kanti Bajpai, “India and nuclear weapons,” in Routledge Handbook ofIndian Politics, ed. Atul Kohil and Prerna Singh (Oxon, England: Routledge,2013), p. 34.and growing survivability.Similar pressures for “operationalization” are building in Pakistan,which like India normally keeps its 100 or so nuclearweapons disassembled and separated from the missiles andplanes that would deliver them in wartime. In a crisis bothcountries will come under pressure to assemble and matethe weapons to their delivery platforms, and move them toforward locations.The Pakistani nuclear posture suffers from many of the samedeficiencies as India’s posture. It has a long way to go to establishadequate positive and negative control. And gearingnuclear operations to early first-use is destabilizing. In short,Pakistan’s nuclear posture carries excessive nuclear risk.The contours of Pakistan’s emerging nuclear “operationalization”are described below. 27Regarding their peacetime storage, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,like India’s, are kept unassembled and separated fromthe non-nuclear explosives as well as from their deliveryvehicles, but it is believed Pakistan could assemble themquickly. Only the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) is responsiblefor carrying out mating procedures, readying the systemfor launch and firing the missiles.After the attacks on September 11, 2001, Pakistan’s militaryrelocated nuclear weapons components to new sites and redeployedthe arsenal to at least six secret locations. Pakistanhas also implemented various security measures to safeguardagainst unauthorized or accidental use, and theft, 28including:• Layers of concentric tiers of armed forces security personnelguarding nuclear weapons facilities;27 See Zia Mian, “Commanding and Controlling Nuclear Weapons,”Controlling the Bomb, ed. Pervez Hoodbhoy (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2013), pp. 204-36.28 Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,”CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, vol. 2 issue 7,July 2009, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf25
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